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A MATERIAL CHANGE TO BRADY: 
RETHINKING BRADY V. MARYLAND, 
MATERIALITY, AND CRIMINAL 
DISCOVERY 
RILEY E. CLAFTON* 
How we think about the trial process, and the assumptions and beliefs 
we bring to bear on that process, shape how litigation is structured.  This 
Comment demonstrates why materiality, and the theory of juridical proof 
informing that standard of materiality, must be redefined for Brady v. 
Maryland doctrine and criminal process.  First, the Comment delineates the 
theory of explanationism—the revolutionary paradigm shift unfolding in the 
theory of legal proof.  Explanationism conceptualizes juridical proof as a 
process in which the factfinder weighs the competing explanations offered by 
the parties against the evidence and the applicable burden of proof.  Applying 
explanationism to criminal process demonstrates that explanationism not 
only is the more accurate account of juridical proof, but also better frames 
the criminal discovery process and ensures due process of law.  The next 
section applies explanationism to Brady doctrine to show that the Supreme 
Court has tip-toed towards a more explanatory view of Brady v. Maryland 
but also faltered and lapsed back into a probabilistic inquiry at critical 
junctures.  As a result, the efficacy of Brady is diminished where it is 
undermined by probabilistic theory or language.  As a result, the doctrine 
should embrace explanationism more wholly.  Under explanationism, 
materiality is determined by assessing whether the suppressed evidence 
could have been used by the defendant to influence the factfinder when 
presenting her case.  To illustrate this argument and its importance in real-
world outcomes, this Comment takes state and federal courts of Texas as a 
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case study.  In Texas, probabilistic definitions of materiality have thwarted 
both Brady doctrine and legislative criminal discovery reform.  The case 
study demonstrates the material consequences for not rethinking materiality.  
Changing our understanding of materiality is critical to protecting the right 
to due process of law in our courthouses and state legislatures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“One does not show a Brady violation by demonstrating that some of 
the inculpatory evidence should have been excluded, but by showing that the 
favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a 
different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”  
 
- Justice David H. Souter1 
 
How we think about juridical proof and the trial process, and the 
assumptions and beliefs we bring to bear on that process, shape how litigation 
is structured.  For most of common law’s history, a probabilistic 
understanding of juridical proof has dominated; we have viewed trials as a 
 
 1 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995). 
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process by which factfinders determine the likelihood that each individual 
element of a claim is met and decide on an outcome accordingly.2  However, 
this theory has proven largely insufficient, particularly because it does not 
account for how factfinders actually reason and come to verdicts.3  Instead, 
explanationism—the theory that factfinders decide cases by weighing the 
parties’ competing explanations against each other and the applicable 
standard of proof—is the best current understanding of juridical proof.4  But 
because probabilistic thinking has implicitly guided American jurisprudence 
for decades, many evidentiary issues and assumptions must be examined 
anew.5 
It is especially important to reexamine Brady v. Maryland for its role in 
a criminal defendant’s right to evidence held by the State and its pervasive 
influence on the American approach to criminal discovery.6  Since Brady, 
 
 2 See 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 388 (1827) (“If there be one 
business that belongs to a jury more particularly than another, it is, one should think, the 
judging of the probability of evidence . . . .”); Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, Relative 
Plausibility and Its Critics, 23 INT’L J. OF EVIDENCE & PROOF 5, 6 (2019); Stephen E. Feinberg 
& Mark J. Schervish, The Relevance of Bayesian Inference for the Presentation of Statistical 
Evidence and for Legal Decisionmaking, 66 B.U. L. REV. 771, 772 (1986) (writing to 
“advocate the use of the Bayesian method as the normative approach to general legal 
principles, an approach that should stem, we claim, from probabilistic considerations”); Lisa 
Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 292 (2013) (“The law of evidence 
rests primarily on theories of knowledge that purport to give an account of accuracy in other-
than-narrative terms. Versions of probability analysis pervade the rules of evidence 
themselves . . . .”); Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738, 746–47 (2012) 
(conceiving of the burden of proof in probabilistic terms). 
 3 Other limitations include probabilism’s inability to explain litigants’ behavior, and its 
challenges in articulating the standard for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See generally 
Allen & Pardo, supra note 2. 
 4 See generally Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, Clarifying Relative Plausibility: A 
Rejoinder, 23 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 205 (2019); Sean P. Sullivan, Challenges for 
Comparative Fact-Finding, 23 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 100 (2019) (“So much recent work 
points in the same direction—that persuasion is the product of purely comparative assessments 
of factual propositions—that those unable to perceive this shift could only be those who refuse 
to see.”); Michele Taruffo, Some Remarks About Relative Plausibility, 23 INT’L J. EVIDENCE 
& PROOF 128 (2019) (agreeing with the central tenants of the theory but noting normative 
issues). 
 5 See infra Section I. Because probabilistic thinking underlies most common law and 
statutory conceptions of evidence, but probabilistic thinking is disconnected from how jurors 
reason and trials function, a revisiting of these doctrines is necessary for the normative goals 
of the legal system to be carried out. 
 6 See infra note 163; see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Daniel S. 
Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533, 1536 (2010) (“As a matter 
of federal constitutional law, prosecutors are not even compelled to furnish the defendant with 
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evidence in criminal cases has been evaluated in terms of materiality—to 
give a criminal defendant due process of law, all “favorable” evidence 
possessed by the prosecutor that is “material to guilt or punishment” must be 
disclosed to the defendant.7  As Brady doctrine has evolved, materiality has 
come to serve both as a threshold standard and as a necessary element to 
prove harm.8  Evidence is assessed for its materiality to the case at the point 
of disclosure, and on appeal or collateral review withheld evidence must be 
sufficiently material—such that its suppression caused enough harm to result 
in a cognizable Brady claim.9  Criminal defendants are not entitled (at least, 
constitutionally) to any evidence that is not material.10  As a corollary, courts 
find no harm to a criminal defendant when evidence that is not “material” 
goes undisclosed.11 
Brady doctrine, like other evidentiary concepts, has been infused with 
probabilistic thinking.12  Even in recent conceptualizations of Brady, 
probabilistic thinking continues to inform materiality, as “evidence is 
‘material’ within the meaning of Brady when there is a reasonable probability 
that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have 
 
the names of prosecution witnesses prior to trial, much less disclose all of the police 
investigative information.”). 
 7 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Defining materiality is an enterprise the Court has struggled with 
for the past fifty years. 
 8 See infra Section II; Cynthia E. Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence 
and the Inference of Innocence, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 422–27 (2010) 
(discussing how materiality serves two key functions: the prosecutor determines what 
evidence must be turned over by assessing its materiality, and the materiality of withheld 
evidence must be proven to successfully show a Brady violation). 
 9 See infra Section II for a more robust discussion; see also Jones, supra note 8, at 422–
27 (explaining how qualifying evidence can be both exculpatory evidence and impeachment 
evidence); Stephanos Bibas, The Story of Brady v. Maryland: From Adversarial 
Gamesmanship Toward The Search for Innocence?, 77 FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP AT PENN LAW 
1, 12 (2005), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/77/ [https://perma.cc/E9S
H-6TW3] (explaining that Brady actions are vital as a vehicle for enforcing rights because 
“the only enforcement mechanism is retrospective.”). 
 10 See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (“A fair analysis of the 
holding in Brady indicates that implicit in the requirement of materiality is a concern that the 
suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial.”). 
 11 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985) (holding that “a constitutional error 
occurs, and the conviction must be reversed, only if the evidence is material”). 
 12 Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 699 (2004) (“In short, [the defendant] must show a 
‘reasonable probability of a different result.’”) (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678); Bagley, 473 
U.S. at 682. 
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been different.”13  However, as this Comment argues, a closer examination 
of Brady doctrine and its evolution shows that there has been a “two steps 
forward, one step back” movement towards the embrace of a more 
explanatory account of materiality, without the Supreme Court ever saying 
so.14  The development of an explanatory lens to assess materiality must be 
realized more fully because a more accurate definition of what evidence is 
“material” is critical to fulfilling the promise of Brady and the right to due 
process of law.15  When a defendant is prevented from presenting her 
explanation to the jury, she is denied a fair trial and due process of law.16  
And although Brady doctrine has evolved substantially, particularly since 
Kyles v. Whitley,17 there remain substantial shortcomings and the need for a 
more explanatory account of materiality.18  The materiality standard has 
substantially restricted the prosecutorial disclosure duty19 by tightly limiting 
what must be disclosed and setting an inaccurately high bar for what evidence 
is sufficiently material to merit any remedy.20 
This Comment argues that the theory of explanationism demonstrates 
the need for legislatures and courts, both state and federal, to reconsider how 
 
 13 Turner v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1885, 1893 (2017) (quoting Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 
449, 469–470 (2009)). 
 14 See infra Section II. 
 15 See infra Section II. 
 16 See infra Section II; see also Brady, 373 U.S. at 86. 
 17 514 U.S. 419 (1995). 
 18 See infra Section II. 
 19 See Bruce A. Green, Federal Criminal Discovery Reform: A Legislative Approach, 64 
MERCER L. REV. 639, 645–46 (2013) (explaining that while some lower courts read Brady and 
its progeny to suggest that all favorable evidence should be disclosed, but a conviction is only 
to be overturned if the evidence is material, most lower courts and the Department of Justice 
read the opinions to hold that favorable evidence can be withheld as long as it is not material). 
 20 There are, of course, other issues with Brady doctrine. For a discussion of these 
shortcomings, see, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002) (“[T]he Constitution 
does not require the Government to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering 
a plea agreement with a criminal defendant.”); Jonathan Abel, Brady’s Blind Spot: 
Impeachment Evidence in Police Personnel Files and the Battle Splitting the Prosecution 
Team, 67 STAN. L. REV. 743, 807–808 (2015); Bibas, supra note 9, at 129; Peter A. Joy, The 
Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping 
Remedies for a Broken System, WIS. L. REV. 399, 425 n.134 (2006) (noting that the 
suppression of material evidence is a significant cause of wrongful convictions, and that 
“suppression [] of exculpatory evidence was found in 43 percent of the exonerations where 
prosecutorial misconduct was a factor leading to the wrongful conviction”); Barbara O’Brien, 
A Recipe for Bias: An Empirical Look at the Interplay Between Institutional Incentives and 
Bounded Rationality in Prosecutorial Decision Making, 74 MO. L. REV. 999 (2009); Jenia I. 
Turner, Plea Bargaining, 3 REFORMING CRIM. JUST. 73, 77 (2017). 
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they determine what evidence is “material” to criminal discovery.21  Not only 
is this undertaking important theoretically, but the real-world consequences 
are also substantial.  The American adversarial system is predicated on 
requiring the State to meet its burden to ensure due process of law and the 
accuracy of verdicts.22  If that system is not structured to accomplish those 
goals, the entire system becomes irrational.23  Theoretical and empirical 
studies of juridical proof have shown that the probabilistic assumptions that 
underlie Brady law and many of our criminal discovery statutes do not align 
with how the proof process is actually structured and operates in practice.24  
This disjunction between what is deemed material by law and what is 
material to a defense in reality undermines a defendant’s right to a fair trial—
a right that Americans have jealously guarded since 1791.25 
This Comment first proceeds by delineating explanationism as a theory, 
its advantages over the probabilistic conception of juridical proof, and the 
role explanationism can play in better conceptualizing the trial process.  The 
 
 21 I acknowledge that broadening the definition of materiality would be infeasible without 
also reconsidering the remedy for a Brady violation, as a violation results in a new trial. See 
Brady, 373 U.S. at 90–91. This Comment focuses purely on fashioning an accurate definition 
of materiality, leaving the question of remedy and the proper allocation of review between 
district and appellate courts—as well as state and federal—open for future inquiry. 
 22 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970) (“Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that ‘[i]t is the 
duty of the Government to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This notion—basic in 
our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society—is a requirement and a safeguard of 
due process of law in the historic, procedural content of ‘due process.’’ In a similar vein, the 
Court said in Brinegar v. United States that ‘[g]uilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that which long experience in the common-
law tradition, to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has crystallized into rules of 
evidence consistent with that standard. These rules are historically grounded rights of our 
system, developed to safeguard men from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting 
forfeitures of life, liberty and property.’”) (citations omitted); Michael S. Pardo, Juridical 
Proof, Evidence, and Pragmatic Meaning: Toward Evidentiary Holism, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 
399 (2000) (“The trial has developed into a condition of a decent society, and we cannot 
overemphasize its importance. Given the trial’s importance and its goal of accurate fact-
finding, it follows that a primary focus of the legal community should be an inquiry into the 
nature of accurate fact-finding.”); Theodore Waldman, Origins of the Legal Doctrine of 
Reasonable Doubt, 20 J. HIST. IDEAS 299, 313 (tracing the doctrine of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt to Aristotle). 
 23 See generally Ronald J. Allen, Reasoning and its Foundation: Some Responses, 1 INT’L 
J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 343 (1997) (“At the core of a society dedicated to civil peace through 
the rule of law must be found rational decision making. Rational decision making—deliberate, 
disinterested, informed, open-minded—forms the bedrock of a just society, and without it the 
phrase ‘rule of law’ loses its meaning entirely.”). 
 24 See infra Sections I, II. 
 25 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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next section applies explanationism to Brady doctrine to show that the Court 
has tip-toed towards a more explanatory view of Brady but also faltered and 
lapsed back into probabilistic inquiry at critical junctures.  As a result, this 
Comment argues, Brady doctrine is diminished in efficacy where it is 
undermined by probabilistic language and theory, and Brady doctrine should 
embrace explanationism more wholly.  To illustrate this argument and its 
importance in real-world outcomes, this Comment takes state and federal 
courts in Texas as a case study.26  In Texas, probabilistic definitions of 
materiality have thwarted both Brady and legislative criminal discovery 
reform.  The case study demonstrates the material consequences of not 
rethinking materiality.  Changing our conception of materiality is critical to 
protecting the right to a fair trial in courthouses and state legislatures. 
I. EXPLANATIONISM: EXPLAINING TRIALS 
A. PROBABILISM AND ITS LIMITATIONS 
The litigation process is structured, at its core, by theories of juridical 
proof.  From the specifics of the Federal Rules of Evidence to the overarching 
burdens of proof, our entire trial system is laden with assumptions and beliefs 
about how human minds draw inferences and how best to determine truth.27  
These assumptions inform how legal procedure is crafted in an attempt to 
regulate that inferential process.28  Because these assumptions structure our 
rules, and our rules then structure how we decide real-world outcomes, it is 
pivotal to be clear and accurate about how we conceptualize trials.  Failure 
to do so can inadvertently sabotage the values which our justice system was 
built to uphold—even those as essential as just outcomes and equality before 
the law.  In criminal cases, when evidentiary issues are decided using faulty 
assumptions, our criminal convictions are cast into doubt. 
 
 26 While examples abound among the circuits, see infra note 164, the Fifth Circuit and 
Texas have been chosen for their pivotal role in the development of Brady law and the state’s 
recent discovery reforms, respectively. 
 27 Pardo, supra note 22, at 410 (“The theorizing of juridical proof and evidence cuts to the 
heart of our entire legal system, with implications that intertwine with our very concept of a 
just society under the Rule of Law.”); Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized 
Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1498 (2001) (“The rules of 
evidence . . . structure the epistemic process by which jurors arrive at beliefs about disputed 
matters of fact at trials.”). 
 28 Michael S. Pardo, Pleadings, Proof, and Judgment: A Unified Theory of Civil 
Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1451, 1454 (2010) (“Understanding how the procedural devices 
relate to the proof process is integral to understanding the standards for each procedural device 
in light of the underlying normative goals and procedural values . . . .”). 
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For most of Anglo-American history, it has largely been assumed that 
juridical proof should be thought about within a probabilistic framework.29  
But scholarly attention to the subject30 has made it increasingly clear that a 
probabilistic account of juridical proof is not only inaccurate, but also 
misleading.31  At first blush, probabilism appears to fold naturally into our 
goal for the legal system—to reconstruct how the world was at the time in 
question and to decide under those conditions whether or not to impose 
liability.  In reality, the theory’s limitations render it more harmful than 
helpful.32  In comparison, the explanatory account33 of juridical proof 
provides an overarching explanation of how factfinders reason with evidence 
and ultimately arrive at conclusions.34  In doing so, the explanatory 
framework better aligns with human cognitive processes and the policy goals 
driving evidentiary doctrine.35 
 
 29 See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of 
Juridical Proof: Probability as a Tool in Plausible Reasoning, 21 INT’L J. OF EVIDENCE & 
PROOF 133, 134 (2017) (“One of the crowning achievements of Enlightenment thought, the 
Constitution of the United States of America, uses probability language in its Fourth 
Amendment, adopted in 1791 essentially as part of the political bargain to adopt the 
Constitution itself in 1789, which reads that ‘no warrants shall issue but upon probable 
cause.’”); Pardo, supra note 22, at 411 (“In recent years, most of the literature discussing fact-
finding has focused on the use of mathematical probability theories as analytical tools to 
resolve legal problems of relevancy and evidence.”); Waldman, supra note 22 at 311 
(discussing how the first modern treatment of evidence, by Baron Gilbert in the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth century, analyzed “[w]hat is the evidence that ought to be 
offered to the Jury and by what rules of Probability ought it to be weighed and considered”). 
 30 See generally Allen & Pardo, supra note 2; Allen & Pardo, supra note 4; Pardo, supra 
note 22, at 400 (“Two recent developments raise these concerns for our understanding of legal 
evidence. First, empirical work in psychology suggests that jurors reason holistically in the 
form of narratives. The second attack on the conventional view comes from within its own 
ranks, in the analytical evidence scholarship of Ronald Allen.”). 
 31 For the seminal work on the topic, see Allen & Pardo, supra note 2. For the purposes 
of this inquiry, I summarize Professors Allen and Pardo’s assessment of the competing 
conceptualizations of juridical proof, as well as why the strengths of explanationism make this 
theory the best current conception of juridical proof. I acknowledge the debate is ongoing and 
hope that this inquiry into materiality provides more evidence of the utility of the explanatory 
account. 
 32 See generally Pardo, supra note 21. 
 33 This is also referred to as explanationism and relative plausibility. 
 34 I do not argue that probabilistic thinking is no longer a dominant epistemology in 
evidence, but that explanationism provides a more powerful lens and has been gaining traction 
in the legal field since developed by Professor Allen. For more information about the contours 
of the current debate, see generally Allen & Pardo, supra note 4. 
 35 Pardo, supra note 22, at 416 (“Experimental psychology provides compelling evidence 
that relative plausibility, not Bayesianism, provides the overarching explanatory model of the 
proof process. Specifically, the findings of Pennington and Hastie support the notion that the 
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Lacking a scientific process by which to divine truth, the legal system 
instead employs procedural tools to arrive at conclusions.  These “decision 
rules” are what the legal system refers to as “burdens of proof”: a 
preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and beyond a 
reasonable doubt.36  The applicable burden of proof establishes the burden of 
persuasion.37  The burden of persuasion is the threshold a plaintiff must meet 
to win her case, and the threshold below which the system will not impose a 
judgment against a defendant.38  These standards are established with policy 
goals operating in the background—to obtain accurate results, tempered by 
pre-established allocations of the risk of error between the parties.39  In 
criminal cases, the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt allocates the 
risk of error away from the criminal defendant, placing the burden instead on 
the State.40  This allocation reflects the longstanding belief that a false 
positive—the erroneous condemnation of a criminal defendant—is far worse 
than a false negative.41 
How, then, does a party meet her burden of proof?  The probabilistic 
account of evidence views the standards of proof as probabilities between 
zero and one, where certain falsity is zero and certain truth is one.42  The 
preponderance of the evidence standard would require a probability greater 
than 0.5 that each element of a claim is met, while the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard would require the prosecution to prove the probability of each 
element to some high probability, around 0.9 or greater.43  The theory looks 
at how probable each individual element is, finding that the element is not 
proven when the probability of its satisfaction merely meets or falls beneath 
 
elemental reasoning required by a Bayesian model and the conventional view conflict with the 
reasoning processes of legal fact finders.”). 
 36 Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence, Probability, and the Burden of Proof, 55 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 557, 558 (2013). 
 37 Allen & Pardo, supra note 2, at 9. 
 38 Id. at 9–10. 
 39 Id. at 10. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 17. A false negative is the failure to convict a guilty person, while a false positive 
is the wrongful conviction of an innocent person. The standard of beyond a reasonable doubt 
is meant to prioritize the prevention of false positives. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 
(1970). 
 42 Allen & Pardo, supra note 2, at 11. 
 43 Id. 
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the requisite threshold.44  To win her case, a plaintiff must prove that the 
likelihood of each element exceeds the burden of persuasion.45 
While this theory seems at first compelling,46 it is largely inadequate. 
Through their scholarship, Professors Ronald Allen and Michael Pardo 
identify many of the insufficiencies of the probabilistic framework, including 
the “conjunction problem” and the difficulty of assigning numbers to 
probabilities in the absence of empirical data.47  Most significant for the 
purposes of this Comment, probabilism does not fit with how jurors or judges 
reason.48  Cognitive evaluation shows that when factfinders decide outcomes, 
they assess evidence holistically; reasoning is not done in an element-by-
element fashion.49  Factfinders think in terms of story and explanation, 
creating narrative structures to evaluate evidence and cases in an integrated 
fashion.50  In fact, jury instructions requiring assessment by the individual 
 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 9. 
 46 The theory appears to provide clarity and precision to vague legal standards, give a 
formal framework, and to intuitively mirror our policy judgments regarding risk of error. Id. 
at 10–14; see also Pardo, supra note 22, at 413–14 (citing PROBABILITY AND INFERENCE IN 
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: THE USES AND LIMITS OF BAYESIANISM (Peter Tillers & Eric D. Green 
eds., 1988)). 
 47 Allen & Pardo, supra note 2, at 14. 
 48 And in the absence of another method by which to search for truth, factfinders are tasked 
with the duty to determine outcomes. 
 49 Id. at 17–18. See generally Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of 
Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991); Dan Simon, Thin 
Empirics, 23 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 82, 85 (2019) (“In other words, the cognitive process 
boils down to transforming states of conflict-laden complexity into states of coherence, a 
process that can be captured by the framework of coherence-based reasoning. The lopsided 
representations in states of coherence are what provide the network with its stability and, 
crucially, they enable fact-finders to reach discrete judgments with sufficient resolve and 
confidence. Indeed, high levels of confidence in the chosen decision, despite the difficulty of 
the task and the equibalance of the options, are one of the central and persistent findings in 
this line of research.”). 
 50 Shari Seidman Diamond et al., The “Kettleful of Law” in Real Jury Deliberations: 
Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1537, 1597 (2012) (studying jury 
deliberations and finding, among other issues, “structural errors arising from the piecemeal 
construction of jury instructions”); Deanna Kuhn et al., How Well Do Jurors Reason?, 5 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 289, 293 (1994) (conducting studies on juror reasoning, and finding that “[t]he 
present results are consistent with Pennington and Hastie’s (1993) claim that story 
construction is a central component of juror decision making. At the same time, the results 
indicate significant individual variation in the manner in which people approach the juror 
task . . . In addition, the variation has implications for task outcome.”); Pennington & Hastie, 
supra note 49, at 519–520 (studying the cognitive processes employed by jurors, and finding 
that jurors construct stories to evaluate cases: “[i]n this research, two key results were 
established that were necessary conditions for pursuit of the Story Model as a viable theory of 
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elements have been shown to confuse jurors.51  The individual legal elements 
may guide the substance of the law, but an individualized assessment of each 
element in isolation is not how factfinders reason.52  Scholars and legislators 
often think about factfinders’ cognitive processes in terms of probability,53 
but this view is inaccurate.54 
The other significant issue with the probabilistic conception is the 
theory’s failure to adopt a comparative framework.  The likelihood of an 
element being proven is not assessed in a vacuum but rather in a comparative 
context.  One party’s ability to compellingly prove her case inherently 
depends on how compelling her opponent is.55  For example, say a defendant 
is on trial for possession of drugs with intent to distribute in a school zone.  
If the prosecutor presents evidence that the defendant was arrested with the 
statutorily prescribed quantity of drugs in her jacket pocket on the school 
yard, and the defendant refused to testify and puts on no other evidence, 
surely it seems likely that the prosecutor has shown that the elements of the 
crime are met.  But just as surely, if the defendant testifies that when she was 
arrested, her significant other asked her to hold onto his jacket while he went 
into the school to pick up his younger sibling, the satisfaction of certain 
 
decision making in the juror context. First, the evidence structures constructed by jurors had 
story structure (not other plausible structures) and verdict structures looked like feature lists. 
Second, jurors who chose different verdicts had constructed different stories. Thus, decisions 
covaried with story structures, but not with verdict representations or story classification 
processes.”). 
 51 Joel Lieberman & Bruce Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us About the Jury 
Instruction Process, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L., 589, 593–94 (1997) (discussing a study of 
jurors in which “only 39% of the elements contained in the instructions were understood,” but 
“54% of the instructions were understood” when examined holistically). 
 52 Pardo, supra note 22, at 402 (“Empirical research confirms that fact finders process 
evidence holistically in the form of theories or stories. Professors Bennett and Feldman 
advance the notion that evidence evaluation involves a choice between competing narratives. 
Professors Pennington and Hastie offer ‘a scientific description of the mind of the juror,’ 
which provides compelling empirical evidence to support this proposition . . . Pennington and 
Hastie posit the Story Model to explain the cognitive processes of jurors. The Story Model 
postulates that jurors impose a narrative story organization on trial information and that the 
story a juror constructs determines that juror’s ultimate decision at trial. Trial advocacy 
scholarship and the courts both embrace this view.”) (citations omitted). 
 53 Pennington & Hastie, supra note 49, at 519–20 (“Probably the most unified descriptions 
of the juror’s thought processes are mathematical models based on . . . variants of traditional 
probability theory, and other algebraic models.”). 
 54 I do not argue that statistical probability does not have a role within trials; instead I 
argue that probability is not the right lens for the overarching theory. See, e.g., Allen, supra 
note 29, at 134. 
 55 Allen & Pardo, supra note 2, at 13–15, 18. 
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elements of the crime becomes substantially less probable.  In all cases, there 
is an inherently comparative aspect, requiring the factfinder not only to look 
at each party’s case in isolation, but also to weigh both parties’ cases against 
each other. 
Finally, in conventional probabilistic thinking, unknown facts are 
skewed towards the defendant.  Even when a civil plaintiff proves her case 
to a probability of 0.4 and the defendant to 0.2, the plaintiff still loses, despite 
having a much more likely case.56  This is not equality before the law.  A 
non-decision is still a decision impacting the substantive rights of the parties 
involved.  Where there are unknowns, the unknowns should not favor one 
side over the other.  Rather than requiring the plaintiff to reach some magic 
probability, explanationism asks jurors to evaluate the parties’ cases against 
each other so that unknowns do not favor either side a priori.57 
B. EXPLANATIONISM EXPLAINS JURIDICAL PROOF 
Explanationism, or relative plausibility, is the alternative to a 
probabilistic account of proof.58  Under an explanatory account of juridical 
proof, the factfinder does not calculate the probability that each element of a 
cause of action is satisfied.59  Instead, the factfinder weighs the parties’ 
explanations of the evidence and comparatively reasons to decide whether 
the plaintiff’s or prosecutor’s explanations can satisfy the requisite burden of 
proof.60  In a standard civil case, this would be demonstration by a 
 
 56 Id. at 14. 
 57 Id. (“Dividing or ignoring the unknown (which amounts to the same thing), on the other 
hand, is consistent with both stated goals regarding accuracy and the risk of error.”). 
 58 See generally id.; Amalia Amaya, The Explanationist Revolution in Evidence Law, 23 
INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 60, 61 (2019) (“Indeed, a fundamental change is involved in the 
shift from probabilism to explanationism. The change, as I will argue later, in conceptual 
structure, values and tools is so deep as to be appropriately described, as Allen and Pardo 
claim, as analogous to a scientific revolution.”); Taruffo, supra note 4, at 131 (“In other words: 
the trier of fact has to determine, on the basis of the available evidence, if a narrative has been 
duly proven (according with the applicable standards of proof). If the evidence does not offer 
any sufficient proof for any of the narratives, then the case will be decided applying the rules 
concerning the burden of proof.”). 
 59 Allen & Pardo, supra note 2, at 12, 15–16. 
 60 Id. 17–18. While the theory of explanationism has only been developed in the past few 
decades, the idea of “weighing the evidence” is rooted in a long history. John Leubsdorf, The 
Surprising History of the Preponderance Standard of Civil Proof, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1569, 1594 
(2015) (“Speaking of the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ or the ‘balance of probabilities’ 
relies on an ancient metaphor comparing the process of judgment to weighing on a set of 
scales. The Egyptians depicted the weighing of a dead person’s heart to determine its 
worthiness, and Homer and Virgil described the divine use of scales when a hero’s fate was, 
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preponderance of the evidence—a selection of the plaintiff’s explanation as 
superior to that of the defendant.61  In a criminal case, the prosecution must 
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.62  To satisfy her burden of proof, the 
prosecution must advance a compelling explanation of guilt, such that the 
defendant is unable to offer any plausible explanation of innocence; if the 
defendant is able to articulate a plausible explanation of her innocence, even 
if less plausible than that of the prosecution, the case results in acquittal.63 
Under explanationism, factfinders weigh the parties’ competing 
explanations against each other and against the burden of proof.64  To obtain 
a verdict, a plaintiff or prosecutor must offer an explanation that not only 
better explains the evidence and events of the case,65 but also contains the 
claim’s legal elements; if not, the defense’s explanation prevails.66  And 
conversely, where an affirmative defense is advanced, the defendant’s 
 
literally, in the balance . . . [B]y the Renaissance, the scales of justice were an iconographical 
commonplace, as they have remained.”). 
 61 Allen & Pardo, supra note 2, at 18–19; Leubsdorf, supra note 60, at 1612–19 
(discussing the evolution of the preponderance of the evidence standard). 
 62 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (“The requirement that guilt of a criminal 
charge be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years 
as a Nation.”). 
 63 Allen & Pardo, supra note 2, at 29. As Professors Allen and Pardo address, scholars 
point out that the defendant has no obligation to present any case at all and may “stand mute.” 
Id. at 22. While this is formalistically true, in practice a defendant cannot expect to do so and 
win, under any theory. Id. 
 64 Id. at 15–16; Amaya, supra note 58, at 62 (“The explanationist turn in evidence law 
may be profitably described as a Hacking-type of revolution in which a new inferential 
method, i.e. explanatory inference, has brought in a new approach to the kind of knowledge 
that we may achieve in the context of legal fact-finding (explanatory knowledge), a novel 
language (abductive logic rather than probability calculus) and a distinctive approach to the 
establishment of the truth-value of novel candidates for truth (e.g. explanations instead of 
probability statements).”); Pardo, supra note 22, at 415–22; Sullivan, supra note 4, at 101 (“At 
every level of research, from the flightily formal to the grittily empirical, an unyielding shift 
in understanding is taking place: moving progressively away from absolutist or propositional 
concepts of what it means to find a fact, and progressively toward comparative definitions of 
facts as the most plausible (least rejected) alternative among the possibilities in 
consideration.”). 
 65 Allen & Stein, supra note 36, at 568 (“To win the plausibility contest, evidence that a 
party relies upon must unfold a narrative that makes sense to a natural reasoner: a layperson. 
There is no algorithm for ‘plausibility;’ the variables that inform judgments of plausibility are 
all the things that convince people that some story may be true, including coherence, 
consistency, coverage of the evidence, completeness, causal articulation, simplicity, and 
consilience (understood as the breadth of the explanation).”). 
 66 Allen & Pardo, supra note 2, at 16. 
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explanation must embrace the claim’s elements to be successful.67  In a 
criminal case, not only must the prosecutor’s explanation be better than that 
of the defense, but the prosecutor must also prove that there is no plausible 
alternative explanation for the crime other than the defendant’s guilt.68  Such 
a requirement maps onto the requirement that guilt be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Thus, the parties are incentivized to give the best 
explanation they can under the time, evidentiary, and resource constraints of 
the litigation—recognizing that factfinders evaluate their claims using their 
natural cognitive reasoning.69 
As Professors Allen and Pardo explain, the explanatory account is more 
accurate and conceptually clear than a probability-based account of proof.70  
The theory avoids the need to assign abstract probabilities to isolated legal 
elements and splits evenly the weight of the unknown evidence between the 
parties.71  Explanationism is derived from how people reason with evidence 
and properly frames litigation as a comparative exercise.  Factfinders look to 
the competing narratives offered by the parties, considering the evidence as 
well as its gaps and incoherence, and evaluate the parties’ explanations 
against the applicable burden of proof.72  In this way, explanationism takes 
evidentiary assessment out of a theoretical vacuum and grounds it in reality.  
Relative plausibility also maps onto our legal system’s rules.  The rules of 
evidence are generally constructed to give parties the ability to admit the 
majority of the evidence which they seek to admit, giving litigants a wide 
latitude to construct their narratives.73 
 
 67 Id. at 18 (“An explanation is selected based on the explanatory threshold, and that 
explanation is assessed in order to determine whether it includes the elements or not.”). 
 68 Id. at 16. 
 69 Id. at 18–19. This is not to suggest that a party cannot plead in the alternative or present 
multiple theories of liability (or innocence); to the contrary, explanationism simply holds that 
the parties will strategically choose their best explanation(s). “This may involve one story, a 
disjunctive explanation composed of two (or more) possibilities, or the entire range of 
possibilities that support their case.” Id. at 25. The only limitations, under explanationism, will 
be the party’s own strategic choices that it makes based on the evidence available, 
admissibility, the underlying substantive law, and what she believes will be most persuasive. 
 70 Id. at 15–19. 
 71 Id. at 17. 
 72 See generally id. 
 73 Allen & Leiter, supra note 27, at 1535–36 (“Apart from the constitutional exclusionary 
rules whose purpose is to vindicate rights, there are only two general exclusionary rules: 
relevancy and hearsay. Relevancy exclusions do keep information from juries, but only that 
information that no person could reasonably rely upon or whose ‘danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury’ substantially outweighs its probative 
value . . . . The hearsay rule keeps only the rankest and least reliable form of evidence from 
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Despite the advantages of the explanatory account, the legal system is 
slow to change, and probabilism bubbles beneath the surface.  For decades, 
probabilistic thinking has undermined the promise that the Supreme Court 
made in Brady v. Maryland.74  Explanationism shows the need for a different 
account of materiality among courts and legislators.  The probabilistic 
framework currently undergirding Brady, by misconstruing juridical proof, 
undermines American criminal process. 
II. EXPLANATIONISM EXPLAINS BRADY V. MARYLAND 
In 1963, the Supreme Court decided Brady v. Maryland, and in a 
sweeping five-page majority declared, “We now hold that the suppression by 
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates 
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”75  In the 
aftermath, defendant John Leo Brady was granted a new hearing, and his 
death sentence was ultimately commuted to life imprisonment.76  For the past 
fifty years, it has been a bedrock of constitutional criminal process that Brady 
requires prosecutors to turn over to criminal defendants evidence that “tends 
to negate their guilt or reduce their punishment.”77  In other words, Brady 
mandates limited discovery instead of trial by ambush.78 
With a defendant’s right to exculpatory evidence unequivocally 
established, the battle shifted to the doctrine’s framework and standards.79  
Subsequent cases slowly but surely led the way to modern Brady doctrine.80  
 
the factfinder, which is quite consistent with the relative plausibility theory and its veritistic 
implications.”) (citations omitted); Allen & Stein, supra note 36, at 569. 
 74 See infra Section II. 
 75 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963). 
 76 Emily Langer, E. Clinton Bamberger Jr., Lawyer Who Won ‘Brady Rule’ for Criminal 




 77 Bibas, supra note 9, at 1. 
 78 The persistent refusal to grant criminal discovery and the gamesmanship in the 
adversary system dates back to the 18th century. Jerry E. Norton, Discovery in the Criminal 
Process, 61 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 11 (1970). 
 79 Jannice E. Joseph, The New Russian Roulette: Brady Revisited, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 33, 35 
(2004). 
 80 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280–81 (1999) (“We have since held that the duty to 
disclose such evidence is applicable even though there has been no request by the accused, 
and that the duty encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence . . . . 
Moreover, the rule encompasses evidence ‘known only to police investigators and not to the 
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Each development of Brady merits a dedicated inquiry, but for this Comment 
one issue stands above the rest: in order for the suppression of evidence to 
constitute a Brady violation, the evidence must be material.81  As will be 
demonstrated, the standard for determining what evidence qualifies as 
material has been undermined by probabilism, thereby increasing room for 
error and the violation of defendants’ rights. 
Initially, the Court premised its materiality decisions almost exclusively 
on probabilistic logic.82  As the doctrine evolved, the Court began hinting 
that lower courts needed to shift to a more explanatory account of materiality, 
without overruling the probabilistic holdings.83  In the process, the Court at 
times contradicted itself, marching two steps forward and one step back.84 
A. EARLY BRADY AND PROBABILISM 
In United States v. Bagley, the Court observed that impeachment 
evidence, “if disclosed and used effectively . . . may make the difference 
between conviction and acquittal.”85  In doing so, it endorsed a holistic 
assessment of the evidence, parenthetically noting that “[t]he jury’s estimate 
of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be 
determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the 
possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant’s life or 
liberty may depend.”86  The Court implicitly recognized that a defendant’s 
explanation at trial, to be complete, needed more details of the story, and that 
the loss of such details could be the difference between guilt and acquittal.87  
 
prosecutor’ . . . therefore, the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable 
evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in this case, including the 
police.”) (citations omitted). 
 81 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674 (1985). 
 82 Id. at 682; Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987) (“[E]vidence is material only 
if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.”) (citations omitted). 
 83 See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 681–88 (2004); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 
419, 435 (1995). 
 84 Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 75 (2012) (“We have explained that ‘evidence is material 
within the meaning of Brady when there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence 
been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ A reasonable 
probability does not mean that the defendant ‘would more likely than not have received a 
different verdict with the evidence . . . .’”) (citations omitted). 
 85 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 (citations omitted). Such language shows acknowledgement of 
the holistic nature of evidence. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187 (1997) (“Evidence thus has force 
beyond any linear scheme of reasoning, and as its pieces come together a narrative gains 
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Material evidence did not need to be exonerating evidence, but instead had 
to include important story-telling context.88  A small difference could change 
the entire outcome of a case. 
Despite the importance of “subtle factors,” the Court crafted a test for 
materiality that hinged on probability.89  Justice Blackmun emphasized that 
“[t]he evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had 
the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different.”90  For the first time, proving materiality required a 
showing that the evidence would have changed the outcome of the trial.91  
Yet Justice Blackmun simultaneously admonished courts to look at the 
totality of the circumstances and remember “the difficulty of reconstructing 
in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the trial would have 
taken had the defense not been misled by the prosecutor’s incomplete 
response.”92  Given the complex narrative structures humans use to determine 
facts,93 this requirement seems to require a court to do the impossible. 
In his dissent, Justice Marshall immediately noted the problems with 
this standard, arguing for an approach that closely resembles the modern 
explanatory perspective.94  Justice Marshall noted that “the existence of any 
small piece of evidence favorable to the defense may, in a particular case, 
create just the doubt that prevents the jury from returning a verdict of guilty.  
The private whys and wherefores of jury deliberations pose an impenetrable 
barrier to our ability to know just which piece of information might make, or 
might have made, a difference.”95  Like the explanatory account, Justice 
Marshall’s dissent acknowledged the holistic nature of evidentiary evaluation 
and the complications of human cognition.  Justice Marshall argued that a 
deprivation of information from the defense was a deprivation from the trier 
of fact, undermining the reliability of verdicts.96  As the explanatory account 
holds, guilt is found by comparing each party’s account, something which 
cannot be done when the defense is missing components of its explanation. 
 
momentum, with power not only to support conclusions but to sustain the willingness of jurors 
to draw the inferences, whatever they may be, necessary to reach an honest verdict.”). 
 88 See infra Section I. 
 89 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 683. 
 93 See supra note 48. 
 94 See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 685 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 95 Id. at 693. 
 96 Id. 
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As a second matter, the dissent emphasized that the majority’s 
materiality test asks the prosecution to divine—before the trial ever occurs—
what evidence could impact the outcome.97  Justice Marshall found such a 
request almost impossible, particularly given that the prosecutor has no way 
of knowing the defendant’s case.98  The prosecutor is required to zealously 
serve victims and the community, and this diminishes her ability to see 
evidence from the perspective of the defense and increases the likelihood that 
she will dismiss or overlook favorable evidence.99  The State meets its burden 
by developing its explanation of the case for the trier of fact,100 so the 
prosecutor cannot make the case of the defendant any more than the 
defendant can make the case of the State. 
The Bagley debates highlight the superiority of explanationism.  For a 
judge assessing a Brady violation or a prosecutor determining what evidence 
to turn over, it is unrealistic to pretend to know how some counterfactual trial 
might unfold.  Each individual juror’s reasoning process is highly variable, 
and those variations directly impact outcomes.101  Individual variation is 
compounded when one factfinder sits on a jury with other factfinders who 
contribute their different backgrounds, prior assumptions, knowledge, and 
perceptions to the group’s reasoning dynamics.102  Any individual can 
employ highly variable cognitive processing on a case-by-case basis, so there 
 
 97 Id. at 699–700 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[The materiality standard] defines the right 
not by reference to the possible usefulness of the particular evidence in preparing and 
presenting the case, but retrospectively, by reference to the likely effect the evidence will have 
on the outcome of the trial . . . Although this looks like a post-trial standard of review, it is 
not. Instead, the Court relies on this review standard to define the contours of the defendant’s 
constitutional right to certain material prior to trial . . . pursuant to a pretrial standard that 
virtually defies definition.”). 
 98 See generally O’Brien, supra note 20. 
 99 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 700–03 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 100 Allen & Pardo, supra note 2, at 16. 
 101 Kuhn et al., supra note 50, at 295. Conducting a study on juror reasoning and verdict 
outcomes, the researchers found that the reasoning capabilities of a juror influence the verdict, 
but a juror’s verdict cannot be predicted by reasoning power alone; additionally, the reasoning 
applied by an individual can vary on a case-by-case basis. Id. 
 102 Brian H. Bornstein & Edie Green, Jury Decision Making: Implications For and From 
Psychology, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 63, 64–65 (2011) (“Why do jurors who 
hear identical pieces of (albeit conflicting) evidence construct different stories? They do so 
primarily because they filter the evidence through their own experiences, expectations, values, 
and beliefs. And, like all decision makers, jurors tend to seek out and remember information 
that is consistent with their verdict preference and scrutinize and reject information that is 
inconsistent with that preference. These initial preferences can come from general legal 
attitudes, preexisting cognitive schemas about the law, pretrial publicity, opening statements, 
or early trial evidence.”). 
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is no way to predict how an entire jury may have reasoned differently.103  
Relative plausibility shows why we cannot look back ex post and decide with 
any confidence how a trial could have changed in light of new evidence;104 
we must redefine materiality to give access to that evidence up front. 
B. BRADY SHIFTS TOWARDS EXPLANATIONISM 
Kyles v. Whitley was a substantial step towards a more explanatory view 
of the materiality standard.105  In addition to holding that a prosecutor has a 
duty to learn of favorable evidence obtained by police and other government 
workers,106 the Court recast materiality in key ways.  First and foremost, 
Justice David Souter stipulated that a “reasonable probability” of a different 
result did not require a different verdict, as the phrase suggests, but instead 
required a showing that the suppression of the evidence undermined 
confidence in the outcome.107  Materiality was not to be treated as a 
sufficiency of the evidence test.108  The Court also reframed the inquiry to 
hold that a defendant shows a Brady violation “by showing that the favorable 
evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different 
 
 103 Allen & Pardo, supra note 2, at 19 (“Evaluating explanations will depend on the details 
of individual cases, at the retail and not the wholesale level, as it were, as well as on the 
background knowledge of the decision maker.”). 
 104 Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 604, 
627 (1993) (“The proffered data become evidence if they influence a fact finder. Whether they 
do is determined by the sum total of that person’s experiences at the moment of decision, 
experiences which will by that time include the advocates’ efforts to enlighten the fact finder 
about the implications of the material produced at trial and all the other observations generated 
by the trial.”). 
 105 514 U.S. 419 (1995). In 1997, two years after its Kyles decision, the Court decided Old 
Chief v. United States and based its ruling on the significance of narrative to the trial process. 
519 U.S. 172, 187 (1997) (“In sum, the accepted rule that the prosecution is entitled to prove 
its case free from any defendant’s option to stipulate the evidence away rests on good sense. 
A syllogism is not a story, and a naked proposition in a courtroom may be no match for the 
robust evidence that would be used to prove it. People who hear a story interrupted by gaps of 
abstraction may be puzzled at the missing chapters, and jurors asked to rest a momentous 
decision on the story’s truth can feel put upon at being asked to take responsibility knowing 
that more could be said than they have heard. A convincing tale can be told with economy, 
but when economy becomes a break in the natural sequence of narrative evidence, an 
assurance that the missing link is really there is never more than second best.”). 
 106 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. 
 107 Id. at 434. 
 108 Id. (“The second aspect of Bagley materiality bearing emphasis here is that it is not a 
sufficiency of evidence test.”). 
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light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”109  Finally, the suppressed 
evidence had to be viewed collectively, “not item-by-item.”110 
Kyles represents a high-water mark for Brady doctrine.  With this case, 
the Court embraces what is very close to an explanatory account of evidence, 
emphasizing that materiality must be decided by evaluating whether the 
evidence could put the case in a different light.111  The holding rejects the 
requirement that a court look at the probability of a change in outcome, 
opting instead for evaluation of the accuracy of the trial as a whole.112  Kyles 
also rejects the probabilistic assessment of each piece of evidence in 
isolation, embracing a standard of materiality that requires greater disclosure 
in order to allow each side to put forth its explanation—holding the State to 
its burden and ensuring due process of law.113 
If Kyles was a high-water mark, Strickler v. Greene was a reversion back 
to probabilities—if not in outcome, then at least in language.  In Strickler, 
the Court reaffirmed its commitment to looking at whether the suppressed 
material could put the case in a different light, but held that the “petitioner 
has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that his conviction or 
sentence would have been different had these materials been disclosed.”114  
As in Bagley, the dissent again called for a different definition of 
materiality.115 
The majority writer for Kyles now writing in dissent, Justice Souter 
argued that the probabilistic language used by the Court in Strickler would 
confuse lower courts, by suggesting that Brady requires showing a change in 
outcome was “more likely than not.”116  Justice Souter traced Brady’s 
 
 109 Id. at 419. 
 110 Id. at 436. And, the prosecution must “make disclosure when the point of ‘reasonable 
probability’ is reached.” Id. at 420. 
 111 Id. at 435. 
 112 Id. at 421 (“On habeas review, we follow the established rule that the state’s obligation 
under Brady v. Maryland, to disclose evidence favorable to the defense, turns on the 
cumulative effect of all such evidence suppressed by the government . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 113 Allen, supra note 104, at 627–28 (“Evidence is not a set of things, as the conventional 
theory would have it; it is instead the process by which fact finders come to conclusions about 
the past . . . a disinterested fact finder reconstructs the past based on all the observational 
inputs available at the moment of judging.”). 
 114 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 296 (1999). 
 115 Id. at 296–97 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 116 Id. at 298 (Souter, J., dissenting).  As Justice Souter explained, “Despite our repeated 
explanation of the shorthand formulation in these words, the continued use of the term 
‘probability’ raises an unjustifiable risk of misleading courts into treating it as akin to the more 
demanding standard, ‘more likely than not.’ While any short phrases for what the cases are 
getting at will be ‘inevitably imprecise,’ I think ‘significant possibility’ would do better at 
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evolution117 to show that the standard’s “circuitous path” was never meant to 
suggest a change in outcome must be “more likely than not” and argued that 
the probabilistic language should be omitted to reflect that the standard is 
something of a “reasonable possibility.”118  Justice Souter’s dissent, while 
not embracing an explanatory definition of materiality, admonished the 
majority for using probabilistic language and focused instead on whether 
suppression of the evidence undermined the conviction’s reliability.119 
C. DO AS I DO, NOT AS I SAY 
Banks v. Dretke was the next stepping stone.  Since Kyles, the Fifth 
Circuit had continued to resist the more holistic analysis that the Supreme 
Court had set out.120  In its review, the Supreme Court engaged in a 
substantial examination of how the suppressed evidence—a key witness’s 
informant status—not only could have changed the jurors’ evaluation of the 
evidence, but also affected how the defense could have gone about its 
strategy differently.121  In doing so, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for 
the majority, acknowledged the interrelated and interdependent nature of the 
evidence, paying particular attention to how the informant’s testimony 
related to other aspects of the State’s explanation advanced at trial.122  In an 
 
capturing the degree to which the undisclosed evidence would place the actual result in 
question, sufficient to warrant overturning a conviction or sentence.”  Id. (internal citations 
omitted). 
 117 Id. (“Brady itself did not explain what it meant by ‘material’ (perhaps assuming the 
term would be given its usual meaning in the law of evidence).”). 
 118 Id. at 298–302. 
 119 Id. at 300–01 (“[T]he touchstone of the enquiry must remain whether the evidentiary 
suppression ‘undermines our confidence’ that the factfinder would have reached the same 
result.”). 
 120 Banks v. Cockrell, 48 F. App’x 104 (5th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub nom Banks v. Dretke, 
540 U.S. 668 (2004). 
 121 Banks, 540 U.S. at 692–704. 
 122 See, e.g., id. at 672 (“Farr was paid for a critical role in the scenario that led to Banks’s 
indictment. Farr’s declaration, presented to the federal habeas court, asserts that Farr, not 
Banks, initiated the proposal to obtain a gun to facilitate robberies. Had Farr not instigated, 
upon Deputy Huff’s request, the Dallas excursion to fetch Banks’s gun, the prosecution would 
have had slim, if any, evidence that Banks planned to continue committing violent acts. Farr’s 
admission of his instigating role, moreover, would have dampened the prosecution’s zeal in 
urging the jury to consider Banks’s acquisition of a gun to commit robbery or his ‘planned 
violence.’ Because Banks had no criminal record, Farr’s testimony about Banks’s propensity 
to violence was crucial to the prosecution. Without that testimony, the State could not have 
underscored to the jury that Banks would use the gun fetched in Dallas to ‘take care’ of trouble 
arising during robberies. The stress placed by the prosecution on this part of Farr’s testimony, 
uncorroborated by any other witness, belies the State’s suggestion that Farr’s testimony was 
328 CLAFTON [Vol. 110 
explanatory fashion, the majority looked at how the suppressed evidence 
related to the other evidence as well as the overall strategy and story.123  This 
is not to say that the Court altered the language of the materiality test.124  But 
in action, the majority employed explanationism by looking not only at how 
the suppressed evidence could have fit with the defense’s explanation 
advanced at trial, but also how the evidence could have changed the defense’s 
strategy and how the evidence’s absence strengthened the prosecution’s 
case.125 
D. MODERN BRADY, A HODGEPODGE OF BOTH THEORIES 
Current cases continue to conflate explanatory evaluation and 
probabilistic language.  Smith v. Cain reiterated the probabilistic test—
evaluating for a “reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 
disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different”—but 
defining a reasonable probability in more explanatory terms, as enough 
likelihood to “undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.”126  Despite 
speaking in probabilistic terms, the Court noted that “[w]e have observed that 
evidence impeaching an eyewitness may not be material if the State’s other 
evidence is strong enough to sustain confidence in the verdict,”127 stressing 
the need to look at the evidence as a whole.  Wearry v. Cain framed the test 
in a more explanatory fashion, requiring lower courts to look for “any 
reasonable likelihood [the suppressed evidence] could have affected the 
judgment of the jury” and whether the suppression of that evidence 
“undermine[s] confidence” in the conviction.128  And in Turner v. United 
 
adequately corroborated. The prosecution’s penalty-phase summation, moreover, left no doubt 
about the importance the State attached to Farr’s testimony.”). 
 123 Id. at 698–703. 
 124 Id. at 703 (“On the record before us, one could not plausibly deny the existence of the 
requisite ‘reasonable probability of a different result’ had the suppressed information been 
disclosed to the defense.”). 
 125 See id. at 698–703. 
 126 Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 75–76 (2012). 
 127 Id. at 76. 
 128 136 U.S. 1002, 1006 (2016) (citations omitted). The Court approvingly cited a line in 
United States v. Agurs: “[I]f the verdict is already of questionable validity, additional evidence 
of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citing 
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 113 (1976)). The majority also reiterated that evidence 
is to be looked at cumulatively. Id. at 1007. Interestingly, the dissent employed a more 
probabilistic framework. Id. at 1008 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The failure to turn over 
exculpatory information violates due process only ‘if there is a reasonable probability that, 
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.’”) (citations omitted). 
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States, the Court again carefully looked at the entire record and how the 
suppressed evidence related.129  These recent cases, with Turner coming 
down in 2017, are Brady’s current articulation. 
What does this mean for materiality, then?  First, a trace of the doctrine 
shows that while probabilistic articulations of the test for materiality remain 
good law, since 1995, the Court has insisted that lower courts look carefully 
at the entire evidentiary record.130  In doing so, the Court requires the 
reviewing judge to gauge whether the suppressed evidence could put the case 
in “a different light”131 and how the parties’ explanations and strategy could 
have changed—rather than whether the evidence would result in a definite 
change in outcome.  Second, the case law addresses the issue of accuracy; 
the standard is often formulated as a question of whether there is concern that 
confidence in the conviction has been undermined.132  There is no doubt that 
Brady jurisprudence forbids a court from looking at each piece of evidence 
alone.133  These developments reflect a dramatic shift, but one that has not 
been fully realized.  Brady language continues to maintain an inquiry into 
probability, while the Court simultaneously requires a searching look at the 
evidence and its relationship to the greater explanations advanced.134 
E. A MATERIALLY DIFFERENT CONCEPTION OF EVIDENCE 
Explanationism shows that materiality should be accorded its 
understood meaning at the time Brady was decided.135  Not to be conflated 
 
 129 See generally Turner v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1885 (2017). 
 130 See generally Banks, 540 U.S. at 668; Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995). 
 131 Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 476 (2009) (remanding “with instructions to give full 
consideration to the merits of Cone’s Brady claim”). 
 132 Id. at 462 (examining whether the suppressed evidence would “undermine confidence 
in the verdict”). 
 133 See supra Section II(B). 
 134 Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 76 (2012) (“Again, the State’s argument offers a reason 
that the jury could have disbelieved Boatner’s undisclosed statements, but gives us no 
confidence that it would have done so.”) 
 135 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 298 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Brady itself did 
not explain what it meant by ‘material’ (perhaps assuming the term would be given its usual 
meaning in the law of evidence.”); Weinstock v. United States, 231 F.2d 699, 701–02 (D.C. 
Cir. 1956) (“‘Material’ when used in respect to evidence is often confused with ‘relevant,’ but 
the two terms have wholly different meanings. To be ‘relevant’ means to relate to the issue. 
To be ‘material’ means to have probative weight, i.e., reasonably likely to influence the 
tribunal in making a determination required to be made. A statement may be relevant but not 
material. Professor Wigmore depicts with some acerbity the difference between relevancy and 
materiality, ‘the inaccuracy of our usage’ of the terms, and ‘the harmfulness of this inveterate 
error.’ Materiality, he maintains, is a matter of substantive law and does not involve the law 
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with relevancy, materiality encapsulates the underlying elements of the claim 
to ask whether evidence has a “tendency to influence, or was capable of 
influencing, the decision of the tribunal in making a determination required 
to be made.”136  Under the explanatory account, material evidence is evidence 
that a defendant could use in constructing her story or theory of the case to 
influence the factfinders.  Just as factfinders reason by evaluating competing 
explanations of the evidence,137 materiality asks whether the evidence in 
question could be used to influence the factfinder in making assessments 
required to be made.138  The issue centers on whether the defendant’s ability 
to construct her case was impaired, not the potential changes in outcome.  
This definition is consistent with both how parties construct cases and how 
juries decide cases.  Cases are decided based on the explanations built around 
the available evidence, so a denial of access to evidence is a denial of access 
to meaningful participation in the trial.139  As Justice Marshall said in Bagley: 
“Formulation of this right [to Brady evidence], and imposition of this duty, 
are the essence of due process of law.  It is the State that tries a man, and it 
is the State that must insure that the trial is fair.”140 
Because Brady materiality remains grounded in probabilism, it is 
problematic.  Jurors and judges do not think about each piece of evidence in 
 
of evidence. He does not include ‘materiality’ in the topics treated in his volumes on Evidence. 
The term ‘material’ is used in many fields of law; for example, insurance law, bankruptcy, 
agency, motions for new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence, and in respect 
to perjury. In respect to materiality in perjury Blackstone said, ‘for if it only be in some trifling 
collateral circumstance, to which no regard is paid, it is not penal.’ The meaning of the word 
appears to be consistent in these various fields. The test is whether the false statement has a 
natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the decision of the tribunal in 
making a determination required to be made. Materiality must be judged by the facts and 
circumstances in the particular case. The color of an accused’s hair may be totally immaterial 
in one case, but in other circumstances the color of his hair may be not only material but 
decisively so.”) (citations omitted). 
 136 Weinstock, 231 F.2d at 702. 
 137 See infra Section I. 
 138 Weinstock, 231 F.2d at 701–02. 
 139 See generally Allen & Pardo, supra note 2. Of course, the rules of evidence will 
continue to require compromises when it comes to admissibility, but this is a separate issue 
from initial disclosure and materiality. 
 140 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 695–96 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
Brady decision, the reasoning that underlay it, and the fundamental interest in a fair trial, 
combine to give the criminal defendant the right to receive from the prosecutor, and the 
prosecutor the affirmative duty to turn over to the defendant, all information known to the 
government that might reasonably be considered favorable to the defendant’s case.”) 
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isolation; they construct narratives.141  The defense attorney constructs an 
entire complex narrative for trial based on all the evidence at her disposal, so 
there is no way for the prosecutor to assess the materiality of evidence 
without making the defense’s case herself.142  Omitting any piece of evidence 
could change how the rest of the evidence is processed and fits together, 
changing the resulting narratives that can be constructed and resulting in an 
outcome that could put the “whole case in such a different light.”143  And 
taking evidence from the defense diminishes its ability to craft its 
explanation, which in effect reduces the State’s burden.  Because trials are a 
process by which factfinders select the explanation that better matches with 
the evidence and satisfies the burden of proof, the loss of evidence on the part 
of the defendant is an affront to the accuracy of trials and due process of 
law.144  The right to due process must encapsulate the right of a defendant to 
fully make her case.  Knowing what we know about human cognition,145 
anything less seems unconstitutional under Brady. 
The explanatory account explains why asking a factfinder to quantify 
the likelihood of various elements being met in isolation “requires frequently 
unavailable information to implement (or must rely instead on subjective 
beliefs).”146  Far from being an objective evaluation, assessments of the 
probability of a given event most typically result in highly subjective 
judgments that are untethered to anything beyond the factfinder’s own belief 
structures.147  Applying such a subjective approach to the element of 
 
 141 Allen & Pardo, supra note 2, at 17–18 (“That jurors typically attempt to construct 
narratives to fit evidence dovetails with the explanatory account of standards of proof. This 
more holistic account of evidence evaluation is inconsistent with probabilistic accounts that 
posit item-by-item processing of evidence in terms of probabilities, leading to a probabilistic 
conclusion for each element.”). 
 142 Robert Hochman, Brady v. Maryland and the Search for Truth in Criminal Trials, 63 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1673, 1689–90 (1996). 
 143 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995). 
 144 Allen & Pardo, supra note 2, at 12 n.43 (“Evidence at trial is contingent. What any 
offer of evidence means depends on all the evidence in the case.”). 
 145 Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Revisiting the Unanimity Requirement: The Behavior 
of the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 201, 212 (2006) (“The deliberations of 
these 50 cases revealed that jurors actively engaged in debate as they discussed the evidence 
and arrived at their verdicts. Consistent with the widely accepted ‘story model,’ the jurors 
attempted to construct plausible accounts of the events that led to the plaintiff’s suit. They 
evaluated competing accounts and considered alternative explanations for outcomes.”). 
 146 Allen & Pardo, supra note 2, at 17. As a result, a probabilistic Brady inquiry either 
asks a judge to do the impossible and find non-existent statistics, or assess materiality from 
her own subjective beliefs and biases. 
 147 Bruno de Finetti, Probabilism: A Critical Essay of the Theory of Probability and the 
Value of Science, 31 ERKENNTIS 169, 174 (1989) (“[H]owever an individual evaluates the 
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materiality—asking judges to essentially guess at the probability that the 
outcome of the trial could change—results in almost complete subjectivity 
and irrationality.148  The explanatory account highlights that “[w]hen 
favorable evidence is in the hands of the prosecutor but not disclosed, the 
result may well be that the defendant is deprived of a fair chance before the 
trier of fact, and the trier of fact is deprived of the ingredients necessary to a 
fair decision”149—directly challenging what we value about the adversary 
process.  If the adversary process is intended to hold the State to its burden 
and achieve certain policy goals,150 a probabilistic standard of Brady 
materiality actually diminishes the doctrine’s effectiveness.  The probability 
language in Brady materiality sets a very high bar—asking for evidence akin 
to the smoking gun, DNA evidence, the transcript of the alternate suspect 
who confessed—when many cases are won and lost on details.151  Recent 
studies support this proposition: “[e]mpirical evidence confirms that most 
Brady and Giglio claims involve not smoking guns but ambiguous evidence, 
which prosecutors can easily overlook.”152 
A party that cannot present her explanation cannot participate fully in 
her trial, and a defendant is denied a fair trial and due process of law in the 
absence of that opportunity.153  As the explanatory account teaches,154 an 
accurate materiality standard is pivotal to a fair trial.  Under the explanatory 
 
probability of a particular event, no experience can prove him right, or wrong; nor in general, 
could any conceivable criterion give any objective sense to the distinction one would like to 
draw, here, between right and wrong.”); see also Allen & Pardo, supra note 2, at 12. 
 148 Allen & Pardo, supra note 2, at 11–13. 
 149 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 694 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 150 See Allen & Pardo, supra note 2, 9–10, 17. 
 151 Medwed, supra note 6, at 1543–44 (“One study by Bill Moushey of the Pittsburgh 
Post-Gazette waded through 1,500 cases and determined that prosecutors routinely withheld 
favorable evidence. Despite this high rate of nondisclosure, appellate courts found reversible 
error in only a handful of cases where the mistakes were so glaring, the conduct so heinous, 
that judges had no other recourse.”). 
 152 Bibas, supra note 9, at 14 (reviewing 448 Brady and Giglio claims which succeeded 
or were remanded between 1959 and 2004, and finding that “only about one-fourteenth of the 
successful or remanded cases fall into the most compelling categories [of suppressed 
evidence]: identification evidence or strong forensic evidence”); O’Brien, supra note 20, at 
999 (applying “the lessons of cognitive science to identify the ways in which prosecutors’ 
distinctive institutional environment may undermine not just their willingness to play fair but 
also their ability to do so”). 
 153 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963) (“A 
prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made available, would 
tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the 
defendant.”). 
 154 Allen & Pardo, supra note 2, at 33. 
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account, Brady works to ensure that the defense has access to the evidence it 
needs to fully develop its explanation and therefore to have due process of 
law. 
III. THE TEXAS STORY 
This Comment has shown that an explanatory account of evidence more 
accurately reflects how factfinders reason and thus demands that legislatures 
and courts reconceptualize what it means for evidence to be material.155  
Explanationism shows why the current standard does not work—deciding 
after the fact what evidence could have changed the outcome of a case is 
difficult when parties create and jurors evaluate cases using a holistic 
reasoning process that incorporates the evidence.156  Furthermore, the 
complexities of human thinking show that a court can very rarely, if ever, 
discern how a juror might reason differently.157  Similarly, it would be almost 
impossible to know how a defendant would have constructed her case 
differently had evidence not been suppressed.  In the past twenty-five years, 
the Supreme Court has moved towards an explanatory definition of 
materiality by evaluating evidence holistically and relationally.158  However, 
the Court has also maintained probabilistic underpinnings and language in its 
definition of materiality, negatively impacting defendants’ right to due 
process of law.159 
The rest of this Comment is devoted to Texas and its discovery act as a 
case study to illustrate the importance of the theory underpinning our 
practice.  Frustratingly, both federal and state courts continue to adhere to 
probabilistic conceptions of materiality at the expense of Brady’s promise of 
a fair trial.160  For this reason, materiality must be redefined even if Congress 
or state legislatures undergo criminal discovery reform.  To illustrate this 
point, the Morton Act of Texas serves as an especially important case 
study.161  The Texas experience highlights both the interaction between the 
 
 155 See supra Section II. 
 156 Allen & Pardo, supra note 4, at 208 (“The primary message of relative plausibility is 
that from beginning to end the legal system pushes the parties to provide competing 
explanations, and these explanations structure the decision that is subsequently made (even if 
the decision is based on an explanation not advanced by the parties).”). 
 157 See Kuhn et al., supra note 50, at 295. 
 158 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995). 
 159 See supra Section II(E). 
 160 See infra Section IV. 
 161 Id. 
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legislature and the courts in enacting reform as well as the importance of the 
assumptions that the judiciary brings to bear on the trial process. 
Brady jurisprudence remains marred by the precedent of piecemeal 
analysis and probabilistic evaluation, but Congress and the states are free to 
adopt more robust criminal discovery.162  Yet beyond its constitutional 
command, the Brady conception of materiality has profoundly impacted 
discovery statutes.  Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and 
many states require the disclosure of criminal discovery in Brady terms, 
using materiality and Brady language to assess what must be disclosed.163  
While discovery statutes need not consider materiality, state legislatures and 
courts have also traditionally adopted this evidentiary view.164 
 
 162 See, e.g., Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 (“We have never held that the Constitution demands 
an open file policy (however such a policy might work out in practice), and the rule in Bagley 
(and, hence, in Brady) requires less of the prosecution than the ABA Standards for Criminal 
Justice, which call generally for prosecutorial disclosures of any evidence tending to exculpate 
or mitigate.”); Green, supra note 19, at 639 (evaluating Congressional legislation efforts to 
expand criminal discovery beyond the requirements of Brady); Beth Schwartzapfel, 
Defendants Kept in the Dark About Evidence, Until It’s Too Late, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/07/nyregion/defendants-kept-in-the-dark-about-evidence-
until-its-too-late.html [https://perma.cc/BMF2-2WXM] (discussing state and ABA efforts to 
expand criminal discovery). Many commenters, however, find that neither Brady nor statutes 
are adequately addressing criminal discovery issues. Jones, supra note 8, at 423 (“Despite the 
nationwide epidemic of Brady violations and the magnitude of injustice that results from such 
misconduct, the criminal justice system has not developed effective reforms to provide a 
remedy for defendants or appropriately sanction prosecutors for concealing evidence 
favorable to the defense.”). 
 163 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; LAURAL L. HOOPER ET AL., TREATMENT OF BRADY V. MARYLAND 
MATERIAL IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT AND STATE COURTS’ RULES, ORDERS, AND POLICIES, 
FED. JUD. CENTER (2004), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/bradymat_1.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/N5KY-J3JR]. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure mandates the 
disclosure of the defendant’s statements and prior records. It also requires the prosecution to 
grant discovery of documents and objects possessed by the government if “(i) the item is 
material to preparing the defense; (ii) the government intends to use the item in its case-in-
chief at trial; or (iii) the item was obtained from or belongs to the defendant.” FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i)-(iii) (emphasis added). Similarly, reports of examinations and tests must “be 
material to preparing the defense” or the government must “intend[] to use the item in its case-
in-chief at trial” before their disclosure will be compelled. Id. at 16(a)(1)(F)(iii) (emphasis 
added). This focus on materiality has, in turn, seeped into state statutes. Emily Dyer et al., 
Statewide Rules of Criminal Procedure: A 50 State Review, 1 NEV. L.J. FORUM 1, 7 (2017) 
(“Although the ALI and other institutions have created model rules, nearly half the states used 
the FRCP to model their own rules.”). 
 164 See infra Section IV. This Comment takes Texas as its primary example of this issue. 
However, many states would equally serve to illustrate. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Discovery 
in State Criminal Justice, 3 REFORMING CRIM. JUST. 147–56 (2017). 
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A. FEDERAL MATERIALITY   
Beyond the limitations of the Court’s holdings in and of themselves, an 
equally significant issue has been lower courts’ resistance to the evolution of 
Brady—and their manipulation of the materiality standard.  Despite the 
Supreme Court’s holdings, some federal and state courts remain reluctant to 
adopt a more robust assessment of materiality.165  In these cases, we see 
adherence to a crabbed analysis which does not give the holistic evaluation 
called for by the Supreme Court.166  Understanding the nature of the problem 
requires examining the relationship between the Fifth Circuit and the 
evolution of the materiality standard under Brady.  To some degree, the 
modern standard applied today evolved from a conversation between the 
Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court. 
Kyles came to the Supreme Court from a Fifth Circuit defendant’s 
appeal.167  The Fifth Circuit claimed at the outset of its opinion that it would 
“examine the evidence presented at trial and how the extra materials would 
have fit,” but really it evaluated the suppressed evidence separately and 
without considering its relationship to the rest of the evidence.168  In fact, the 
 
 165 Haskell v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 866 F.3d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Once a 
petitioner demonstrates ‘a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different,’ the inquiry is over . . . .”) 
(citations omitted); United States v. Shields, No. 15–cr–00200–REB, 2017 WL 3085513, at 
*5 (D. Colo. July 20, 2017) (“The criterion of materiality is met only if there is a ‘reasonable 
probability’ that the outcome of a trial would have been different had the evidence been 
disclosed to the defense.”) (citations omitted); Pennsylvania v. Natividad, 200 A.3d 11, 32–
33 (Pa. 2019) (finding that “[t]here is no dispute the Commonwealth failed to disclose these 
materials to the defense prior to trial, and some of them were plainly exculpatory on their face, 
as they identified an alternate suspect who allegedly claimed responsibility for the murder,” 
yet holding that “the Commonwealth’s evidence against appellant was so overwhelming there 
is no reasonable probability that if the Commonwealth had turned over the relevant evidence 
the result of the trial would have been different”); Ex parte Carty, 543 S.W.3d 149, 177 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2018) (“Exculpatory evidence is that which may justify, excuse, or clear the 
defendant from alleged guilt. None of the witnesses stated that Carty was not involved in the 
murder. While the withheld witness statements may have contained inconsistencies that could 
have been brought out at trial to impeach those witnesses, none of those statements contained 
information justifying, excusing, or clearing Carty from the alleged guilt, or eliminating her 
as a party to this offense.”). 
 166 See supra notes 164–165. This is not to say that all courts take this limited view of 
materiality; see, e.g., Tempest v. State, 141 A.3d 677, 687 (R.I. 2016) (“Contrary to what the 
dissent suggests, whether the defense would have actually used the statements is not relevant 
to our analysis—the bottom line is that it should have been defense counsel’s choice to 
make.”). 
 167 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 422. 
 168 Kyles v. Whitley, 5 F.3d 806, 811–12 (5th Cir. 1993), rev’d, 514 U.S. 419 (1995). 
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court even analyzed different components of a single transcript separately, 
separating whole documents into piecemeal evidence.169  On review, the 
Supreme Court held that 
[a]lthough the [Fifth Circuit] majority’s Brady discussion concludes with the statement 
that the court was not persuaded of the reasonable probability that Kyles would have 
obtained a favorable verdict if the jury had been ‘exposed to any or all of the 
undisclosed materials,’ the opinion also contains repeated references dismissing 
particular items of evidence as immaterial and so suggesting that cumulative materiality 
was not the touchstone.170 
The Court stressed that the sum of the suppressed evidence could allow the 
jury to decide differently, and so “confidence that the verdict would have 
been unaffected cannot survive.”171 
 
 169 The Fifth Circuit analyzed the evidence in an individualized fashion, in such a way as 
to suggest that no amount of evidence could have changed the outcome of trial. All of the 
evidence in the list to follow was dismissed as insufficient. 
1. Use of the police transcript to show a prosecution informant had framed the 
defendant: “Even without these documents, Kyles made a credible case that 
Beanie could have planted this evidence.” 
2. Use of the police transcript to show the informant had been at the scene: “These 
notes refer to Beanie’s presence at Kyles’ apartment for Sunday dinner. 
Corroborating Beanie’s presence, however, adds little credibility to an 
assertion that Beanie smuggled evidence in and hid it about the apartment on 
that occasion.” 
3. Use of the police transcript to show a second motive for the prosecution 
informant: “Beanie’s request for the money on the transcript would have been 
cumulative, at best.” 
4. Use of the police transcript to show the informant had purchased the stolen car: 
“Ultimately, this evidence is at best cumulative on a factual point not rebutted 
by the State. The nondisclosure of this much of the transcript was 
insignificant.” 
5. Use of the police transcript to impeach the credibility of the informant: “This 
is but one problem. More importantly, evidence that Beanie lacked credibility 
would have had little impact on this case.” 
6. Use of written statements to impeach a second witness: “Smallwood never 
made a statement calling his ability to recognize the gunman into question, and 
we are not persuaded that use of this material by the defense would have 
undermined the force of his identification, particularly in light of its 
corroboration by others.” 
7. Use of a license plate printout to show cars at the scene: “The evidence of guilt 
was otherwise so overwhelming that the rebuttal of the photograph would have 
made no difference.” Id. at 811–18. 
 170 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 440 (providing examples of Fifth Circuit language, in which the 
court dismissed and qualified each individual piece of evidence as insignificant, in isolation). 
 171 Id. at 454. And, without this evidence, the defendant was unable to meaningfully 
advance his explanation. 
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This materiality conversation continued ten years later in Banks v. 
Dretke.172  The Fifth Circuit held that a key witness’s paid informant status, 
the pending charges against him, and his role in the indictment of the 
defendant were immaterial to the defendant’s conviction.173  In finding that 
the witness’s “testimony was corroborated by other witnesses and the 
information’s impeachment value would have been cumulative,” the Fifth 
Circuit overturned the relief the district court had granted.174  In doing so, the 
majority did not incorporate any of the holistic examination called for by 
Kyles.175  The Supreme Court overturned the Fifth Circuit, reiterating its 
commitment to looking at whether the evidence could put the case in a 
different light.176  The Court looked at the critical role which the paid 
informant played in the case from arrest, to indictment, to penalty phase.177  
The Court highlighted in particular how the paid informant’s testimony was 
critical to the narrative that the State presented in the penalty phase of the 
trial.178  Defendant Banks’ legal battle continued for thirty-two years before 
he was saved from the death penalty.179 
Like Kyles and Banks, Wearry v. Cain180 was also an appeal from 
misapplication of Brady doctrine in the Fifth Circuit.  These cases highlight 
the Fifth Circuit’s repeated resistance to viewing materiality more broadly 
and accurately.  They also show how probabilistic definitions of materiality 
undercut a defendant’s access to evidence; a probabilistic view of the 
doctrine separates out each piece of evidence and views it in isolation, 
discounting the holistic reasoning process of the factfinder.181  This insistence 
on probabilistic thinking in the Fifth Circuit has arguably been pivotal in the 
 
 172 Banks v. Cockrell, 48 F. App’x 104, 112 (5th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub nom. Banks v. 
Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004). 
 173 Id. at 112–16. 
 174 Id. at 137. 
 175 See generally id. 
 176 Banks, 540 U.S. at 698–99. 
 177 Id. at 697–702. 
 178 Id. at 699–703. 
 179 Brandi Grissom, Death Row Inmate’s Sentence Reduced to Life, TX. TRIB. (Aug. 2, 
2012), https://www.texastribune.org/2012/08/02/death-row-inmates-sentence-reduced-life/ 
[https://perma.cc/LT9V-BEY3]. 
 180 136 U.S. 1002, 1006 (2016). 
 181 Cf. Allen & Pardo, supra note 2, at 16 (“A number of general criteria affect the strength 
or quality of an explanation. These criteria include considerations such as consistency, 
coherence, fit with background knowledge, simplicity, absence of gaps, and the number of 
unlikely assumptions that need to be made.”). 
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development of Brady doctrine, but courts still persist in their crabbed and 
limited view of materiality. 
B. STATE MATERIALITY 
The problem is by no means limited to federal courts.  Turning our focus 
to the states and our case study of Texas, even after Kyles and Banks, Texas 
state courts still evade the materiality analysis mandated by the Supreme 
Court by blending materiality with prejudice and only parenthetically noting 
the correct standard.182  The Texas test cites to Strickler (the probabilistic 
opinion between Kyles and Banks), Bagley (a pre-Kyles case decided in 
1985), and formulations of the standard written by Texas courts that do not 
engage in holistic analysis, inquire whether evidence changes the narrative 
at trial, or apply any of the developments in Brady law since the 1980s.183  
This refusal to use the more recent and explanatory analysis of the Supreme 
Court is persistent.184  Indeed, Texas courts will often misstate the law: 
The court of criminal appeals has held that to find reversible error under Brady, an 
appellant must show that . . . the evidence is material, that is, it presents a reasonable 
probability that had the evidence been disclosed, the outcome of the proceeding would 
have been different. We analyze an alleged Brady violation in light of all the other 
evidence adduced at trial.185 
The problems caused by a clubbed view of materiality have also seeped 
into statutory criminal discovery.  Prior to amendment in 2013,186 the Texas 
criminal discovery statute, Article 39.14(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal 
Procedure, only allowed defendants (under certain, limited circumstances) to 
produce or inspect “evidence material to any matter involved in the action” 
and “in the possession, custody, or control of the state.”187  And state courts 
 
 182 Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d 698, 726–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). But see Banks, 540 
U.S. at 703, (“The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have 
received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair 
trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”) (quoting Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)). 
 183 Reed, 271 S.W.3d at 726–27. 
 184 See, e.g., Gill v. State, No. 01-09-01012-CR, 2010 WL 4910210, at *4 (Tex. App. Dec. 
2, 2010) (quoting Hampton v. State, 86 S.W.3d 603, 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (quoting 
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109–10 (1976))); Lempar v. State, 191 S.W.3d 230, 241 
(Tex. App. 2005) (citing Ex parte Richardson, 70 S.W.3d 865, 870 n.22 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2002)). 
 185  Pitman v. State, 372 S.W.3d 261, 264 (Tex. App. 2012) (citations omitted). 
 186 This statute’s amendment will be discussed at length in the following section. For now, 
I limit my discussion to state court interpretations of the statute prior to its amendment in 2013. 
 187 Ehrke v. State, 459 S.W.3d 606, 611 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). 
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had, in turn, held that “[e]vidence is material if its omission would create ‘a 
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.’”188  In formulating this 
standard for materiality, Texas courts reverted materiality back to 1976, 
citing to United States v. Agurs.189  In this move, the state courts of Texas 
actually entitled a defendant to less statutory discovery than she is owed 
under the constitutional minimum required by current Brady 
jurisprudence.190 
Texan interpretations of the discovery statute look for the creation of 
doubt, a burden never meant to be imposed upon the materiality standard.191  
This standard does not consider the need to ensure due process of law, the 
search for accuracy, or how the suppressed evidence could change the 
narrative presented at trial.192  Instead, Texas courts consistently define 
materiality by citing to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ Quinones v. 
State decision, which in turn cited to Agurs and held that the defendant’s 
burden for proving materiality surpasses the harmless error standard and is 
only met “if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not 
otherwise exist.”193  The dissent pointed out that there was no evidence that 
the legislature intended such a limited reading of materiality, and rather 
intended to expand upon the Supreme Court’s constitutional minimum, but 
 
 188 Id. at 611 (citing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112) (emphasis added). The Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals has remained steadfast in its commitment to the 1976 Brady standard, which 
it adopted more than thirty years ago. Quinones v. State, 592 S.W.2d 933, 941 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1980), abrogated on other grounds by Ehrke v. State, 459 S.W.3d 606 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2015) (“More recently in Stone v. State and Frank v. State, this Court has expressly chosen to 
define ‘materiality’ under Texas law in the due process terms employed by the Supreme Court 
in United States v. Agurs, one of the more recent elaborations on the disclosure requirements 
of Brady v. Maryland.”). 
 189 Quinones, 592 S.W.2d at 941. 
 190 Compare Ehrke, 459 S.W.2d at 611 (“Evidence is material if its omission would create 
a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.”) (citations omitted) with Banks v. Dretke, 
540 U.S. 668, 698 (2004) (“[T]he materiality standard for Brady claims is met when the 
favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as 
to undermine confidence in the verdict.”) (citations omitted). 
 191 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). 
 192 Branum v. State, 535 S.W.3d 217, 224–28 (Tex. App. 2017) (evaluating the impact of 
each piece of suppressed evidence in isolation). 
 193 Quinones, 592 S.W.2d at 941–42 (citing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112). 
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to no avail.194  And as Brady doctrine has evolved in the years since Agurs, 
Texas has not updated its standard.195 
While Agurs has not been overturned, there is no debating that 
materiality analysis has dramatically evolved since 1976, and it is 
disingenuous for Texas courts to pretend otherwise.196  Under Texas’s 
formulation of materiality, the state criminal discovery statute gives 
defendants less access to discovery than is constitutionally required, let alone 
a level of discovery sufficient to ensure accurate truth-finding.197 
IV. THE “MORTON ACT” AS A CASE STUDY 
How courts define materiality matters a great deal for the litigants in our 
courts, and courts need to shed their prior assumptions about materiality to 
protect due process of law.  Redefining materiality is essential even where 
legislatures step in with reform,198 as the “Michael Morton Act” of Texas so 
aptly demonstrates.  While legislatures can serve a key role in discovery 
reform,199 judicial reform remains integral. 
 
 194 Id. at 947–48 (Robert, J., dissenting) (“It should be abundantly clear from even a 
cursory reading of Article 39.14 that the Legislature intended no such restrictive definition 
and that Article 39.14 was not meant to be a mere codification of Brady v. Maryland. 
Materiality in the context of Article 39.14 should be accorded its commonly understood legal 
meaning . . . ’[t]o be ‘material’ means to have probative weight: i. e., reasonably likely to 
influence the tribunal in making a determination required to be made.’”) (citations omitted). 
 195 See, e.g., Ehrke, 459 S.W.3d at 606. 
 196 See, e.g., Dickens v. Court of Appeals for the Second Supreme Jud. Dist. of Tex., 727 
S.W.2d 542, 559–60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (Clinton, J., dissenting) (“As demonstrated in 
the margin, the stark reality is that this Court has taken a simple job of fulfilling statutory 
requirements for obtaining discovery—practically like procedure on the civil side—and turned 
it into a requirement that in its constitutional sense ‘materiality’ to the defense of an accused 
must be shown when discovery is refused. Unlike a broad scope of discovery in civil cases, in 
a criminal prosecution, as the majority opinion emphasizes, ‘the right to discovery is limited 
to exculpatory or mitigating evidence.’”) (citations omitted). 
 197 As noted above, Texas courts also define materiality under Brady in a limited way—
reading out Kyles, Banks, and most of the language used by the Supreme Court now. See infra 
Section III(B). This conception of materiality ignores the impact any piece of evidence could 
have on how a party constructs her story, the arguments she makes at trial, or the cognitive 
reasoning the jury undertakes. 
 198 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (West 2017). 
 199 A survey of the states shows that while many states require a minimal to intermediate 
level of discovery, there has been a movement towards broader and more open file discovery. 
THE JUSTICE PROJECT, EXPANDED DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES: A POLICY REVIEW 8 (2007) 
(finding that “one-third of the states (including California, Florida, New Jersey, Illinois, 
Michigan, and Pennsylvania) have implemented discovery rules modeled on the ABA 
standards,” which do not call for an assessment of materiality); see also Brown, supra note 
164; DISCOVERY REFORM LEGISLATIVE VICTORIES, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL 
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A. THE MORTON ACT, ART. 39.14 OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE OF TEXAS 
Michael Morton was released from prison on October 14, 2011, after 
spending twenty-five years in prison for the murder of his wife—a crime he 
did not commit.200  During Morton’s trial, prosecutors withheld evidence of 
his son’s eyewitness account that his father was not the killer, neighborhood 
reports of a man in a green van seen lurking around the Morton’s home, and 
evidence of his wife’s credit card being used after her death.201  With this 
evidence withheld, Morton was convicted. 
While no single cause can bring about reform alone, Morton’s persistent 
advocacy after his exoneration—so no other innocent defendant would suffer 
his fate—was instrumental.202  Faced with a series of high-profile wrongful 
convictions like Morton’s and a judiciary exhibiting a bulldogged refusal to 
give defendants access to evidence, the Texas legislature entered the 
conversation by introducing Senate Bill 1611, the “Michael Morton Act.”203  
The Morton Act was drafted through the efforts of all stakeholders, including 
prosecutors and defense attorneys, and passed with bipartisan, unanimous 
support.204  The legislature’s passage of Senate Bill 1611 made major 
changes to Article 39.14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Texas, the 
state’s criminal discovery provision, which had remained untouched since 
1965.205 
Explaining the bill and its purpose, the Senate Committee Report stated 
that SB 1611 “requires prosecutors to turn over to the defense any relevant 
evidence that may help the defendant, including witness lists.”206  Before 
 
DEFENSE LAWYERS, https://www.nacdl.org/criminaldefense.aspx?id=31324 [https://perma.cc/
9VUV-22UP] (discussing the legislative broadening of criminal discovery in New York, 
Virginia, California, Texas, Louisiana, Ohio, and North Carolina); Green, supra note 19 
(assessing federal efforts at legislative reform to broaden criminal discovery). 
 200 The Innocence Project, Michael Morton, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.inno
cenceproject.org/cases/michael-morton/ [https://perma.cc/DJD4-A7FV]. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Jessica A. Caird, Significant Changes to the Texas Criminal Discovery Statute, 51 
HOUS. LAW. 10, 10 (2014); Brandi Grissom, Morton Act, Prosecutor Accountability Bill Head 
to Governor, TEX. TRIB. (May 14, 2013), https://www.texastribune.org/2013/05/14/house-
approves-morton-act-sanctions-prosecutors/ [https://perma.cc/RU6C-P57F]. 
 203 See generally Grissom, supra note 202. 
 204 See generally TEX. APPLESEED & TEX. DEF. SERV., TOWARDS MORE TRANSPARENT 
JUSTICE: THE MICHAEL MORTON ACT’S FIRST YEAR (2015); Grissom, supra note 202. 
 205 TEX. APPLESEED & TEX. DEF. SERV., supra note 204, at 1. 
 206 S. COMM. ON CRIM. JUST., BILL ANALYSIS, TEX. S.B. 1611, 83d Leg., R.S. 1 (2013), 
https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/83R/analysis/pdf/SB01611S.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NZF-26
6D] [hereinafter COMMITTEE REPORT] (emphasis added) (“Criminal discovery—the exchange 
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detailing the bill’s new provisions, the report addressed the key reasons for 
the bill and for reform: the need for fair trials and efficiency in the judicial 
system, the necessity that defendants be able to make informed decisions to 
plead, the obligation to uphold the constitutional right to present a full 
defense, and the goal to “lessen[] the likelihood of an overturned verdict on 
appeal.”207  The Senate Report emphasized that open file discovery “saves 
thousands of dollars in appeals, incarceration, and potential compensation for 
wrongful convictions,” as well as establishes uniformity, so that a 
defendant’s chance at a fair trial would not vary by where in the state she was 
tried.208  Most importantly, the Bill’s drafters declared that “[e]very 
defendant should have access to all the evidence relevant to his guilt or 
innocence, with adequate time to examine it.”209  In passing SB 1611, the 
legislature adopted a new model and values for discovery—essentially 
embracing an explanatory account of juridical proof. 
The Morton Act was a watershed change.  Pre-Morton Act, all discovery 
was left to the courts’ discretion, and until 2005 “a motion of the defendant 
showing good cause” was required before a court would grant the defendant 
access to a limited category of material evidence.210  Moreover, abuse-of-
discretion standards insulated both prosecutors and trial judges that declined 
to grant discovery from appellate censure and reversals.211 
The 2013 Morton Act substantially amended the first section of Article 
39.14 and added twelve additional sections.212  Because the first section of 
Article 39.14 sets out the majority of what is discoverable and the key 
procedures for discovery, these changes were the most significant.213  The 
legislature eliminated the requirement that a defendant show cause to obtain 
 
of relevant information between prosecutors and the defense prior to trial—is both necessary 
for a fair and just criminal justice system, and also required as part of a defendant’s 
constitutional right to a full defense.”). 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. 
 210 Caird, supra note 202, at 10–11. The prior versions of Article 39.14 were easy for 
prosecutors to circumvent. Gerald S. Reamey, The Truth Might Set You Free: How the 
Michael Morton Act Could Fundamentally Change Texas Criminal Discovery, Or Not, 84 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 893, 902 (2015) (“[A]rticle 39.14 never functioned as a true discovery 
statute, but only as a kind of safety net to prevent the worst kinds of unfairness to the 
accused.”). 
 211 Reamey, supra note 210, at 902–03. 
 212 Caird, supra note 202, at 10. 
 213 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 206, at 1. I focus on the most substantial change—the 
amendment to the first section. 
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discovery and required broad access to evidence given a “timely request from 
the defendant.”214  Production allowed for the actual duplication of evidence 
and included police reports and witness statements for the first time.215  The 
statute also required that “the State [] provide copies of designated 
documents, papers, written or recorded statements of the defendant, books, 
accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things not otherwise 
privileged that contain material evidence and are in the possession of the 
State or any person under contract with the State.”216 
Open file discovery legislation like the Morton Act gives the defense 
access to all information that is, or should be known to the prosecution, law 
enforcement, and other agencies working for the prosecution, with the 
exception of any privileged material.217  And prosecutors can still seek a 
protective order to withhold sensitive information from defense counsel.218  
By granting the defendant access to any unprivileged evidence, and therefore 
giving her counsel the full opportunity to present a complete explanation of 
the case to the factfinders, open file discovery helps to hold the State to its 
burden.219  And the benefits are not limited to due process: “the nondisclosure 
of information beneficial to criminal defendants causes wrongful 
convictions, wasteful litigation, and uncertainty in criminal adjudications.”220  
In terms of judicial economy, open file discovery limits, if not eradicates, the 
necessity for extensive post-conviction Brady claims.221 
 
 214 Id. at 2. 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. 
 217 THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 199, at 2. 
 218 Joy, supra note 20, at 425. 
 219 See supra Sections I, II. 
 220 Janet Moore, Democracy and Criminal Discovery Reform After Connick and Garcetti, 
77 BROOK. L. REV. 1329, 1371 (2012). It is estimated that some form of prosecutorial 
misconduct contributes to more than half of all wrongful convictions. % Exonerations by 
Contributing Factor, THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Oct. 23, 2019), https://
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ExonerationsContribFactorsByCrime.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/PXJ9-FNDL]. 
 221 This is not to say that there is not opposition to open file discovery or criticism. For a 
summary on the competing arguments, see Brown, supra note 199. 
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B. A MATERIAL LIMITATION ON REFORM 
Despite the landslide and bipartisan nature of the reform,222 the Morton 
Act has not been able to deliver fully on its promise of open file discovery.223  
Texas courts have shown that old precedent dies hard, and without a material 
rethinking of juridical proof, reform cannot truly be realized. 
Given the purpose of the act explicitly stated by the legislature—that 
“[e]very defendant should have access to all the evidence relevant to his guilt 
or innocence, with adequate time to examine it”224—and the explicit 
designation of the Morton Act as one of open file discovery, discovery 
disputes should require only one straightforward question: was the defendant 
given broad access, or did the prosecution fail to disclose evidence the statute 
makes available to the defendant? 
But Texas courts often gut the changes made to Article 39.14.225  While 
the revisions were substantial, portions of the language from the prior act 
were left in place.226  Notably, this included the requirement to produce 
“designated . . . evidence material to any matter involved in the action.”227  
In ruling on discovery issues, the Texas Court of Appeals held: 
If we were writing on a clean slate to interpret what evidence is “material to any 
matter,” we would be inclined to construe this phrase, at a minimum, to include any 
evidence the State intends to use as an exhibit to prove its case to the factfinder. We do 
not write on a clean slate. The phrase at issue, “that constitute or contain evidence 
material to any matter,” was present in Article 39.14 before it was amended by the 
Michael Morton Act. The phrase was not modified or defined by the Legislature when 
it passed the amendments to Article 39.14. What is “material” had been subject to 
substantial judicial interpretation prior to the debate and passage of the Michael Morton 
Act. Thus, applying well-established precedent from the Court of Criminal Appeals, by 
which this Court is bound, we are constrained to hold that the definition or standard we 
must use to determine whether the objectionable evidence was material is the same 
after the passage of the Michael Morton Act as it was before passage, regardless of 
what the Legislature may have thought they were accomplishing. 228 
The point is worth repeating—the Court of Appeals held that, regardless 
of what the legislature thought it was accomplishing, a prosecutor is only 
 
 222 TEX. APPLESEED AND TEX. DEF. SERV., supra note 204, at ii (“This legislation received 
bipartisan support in both chambers and was drafted in consultation with stakeholders who 
work in nearly every division of the criminal justice system.”). 
 223 See generally Reamey, supra note 210. 
 224 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 206, at 1. 
 225 Watkins v. State, 554 S.W.3d 819, 824 (Tex. App. 2018). 
 226 Caird, supra note 202, at 10–11. 
 227 TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 39.14 (West 2017). 
 228  Watkins, 554 S.W.3d at 824. 
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required to turn over what is material.229  And to make the blow all the more 
severe, courts employ an antiquated definition of materiality—indeed, one 
that has been in use since 1980.230  The court’s interpretation limits 
defendants to evidence which would, with reasonable probability, change the 
outcome of trial.231  This definition of materiality is not only counter to the 
legislature’s desire, but also runs counter to the entire explanatory account. 
Even with passage of the Morton Act, Texas courts consistently hold 
that “[e]vidence must be indispensable to the State’s case or must provide a 
reasonable probability that its production would result in a different outcome 
to be considered material and subject to mandatory disclosure under Article 
39.14(a).”232  In fact, courts even conflate the Morton Act with Brady itself: 
“[b]oth the statute and Brady require that the data be ‘material’ before it is 
discoverable.  And, like the definition of ‘material’ in a Brady setting, 
materiality for purposes of Article 39.14(a) means that ‘there is a reasonable 
probability that had the evidence been disclosed, the outcome of the trial 
 
 229 The court did so knowing that it was disregarding the intent of the legislature in 
amending the statute. Id. at 824 n.1 (“While we generally agree that a sea change in criminal 
discovery was anticipated, and probably intended as a result of the passage of the amendments, 
the legislature’s writings do not always accomplish what was intended and further amendment 
is thus required. The legislature did not change a term in the existing statute that had already 
been interpreted by the State’s highest court in criminal matters. As we explained in our 
opinion, we do not write on a clean slate . . . Accordingly, we decline the invitation of the 
Amicus Curiae to revisit our analysis and holding of the meaning of ‘material’ as used in 
article 39.14.”). 
 230 Id. at 822 (“Therefore, we hold that in order to establish that requested evidence is 
material, it is necessary that a defendant must provide more than a possibility that it would 
help the defense or affect the trial. Materiality for purposes of Article 39.14(a) means that 
‘there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed, the outcome of the trial 
would have been different.’”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 231 Id. 
 232 Carrera v. State, S.W.3d 554, at *2 (Tex. App. 2018) (citations omitted); Branum v. 
State, 535 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex. App. 2017) (“To establish that requested evidence is 
material, a defendant must provide more than a possibility that it would help the defense or 
affect the trial.”). A review of prosecutorial briefs shows that many prosecutors are pushing 
for this interpretation. See, e.g., State’s Response and Objection at 3, State v. Oliver, (Tex. 
Dist. Ct., Aug. 2., 2018), No. F17-18595-V, 2018 WL 4185923 (“To be considered material 
and to be subject to mandatory disclosure under Article 39.14(a), a defendant must show a 
reasonable probability that production of the evidence would result in a difference in the 
outcome of the proceeding . . . Defendant has not shown materiality here, nor has he attempted 
to do so. Furthermore, the State does not believe that production of the evidence would alter 
the outcome of the proceeding or that the information is subject to discovery under Article 
39.14 . . . That a request ‘could’ reveal significant information is nothing more than a mere 
possibility, which is insufficient for purposes of mandatory disclosure under Article 
39.14(a).”) 
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would have been different.’”233  To be sure, there has been at least one case, 
in dicta, interpreting the Morton Act in line with an open file regime,234 but 
this case was not published and is non-binding.  Further, prosecutors in Texas 
have actually alleged wrongful termination for their compliance with Brady 
and the Morton Act.235 
The courts of Texas interpret the new discovery regulation using 
conceptions of materiality that predate the Morton Act and modern Brady 
doctrine by thirty years.  More importantly, this interpretation actively 
disregards the intention of the Texas legislature, showing that statutory 
change alone can be ineffective in bringing about discovery reform.236  
Juridical theories and assumptions about the trial process and what role 
evidence has in arriving at truth and accuracy are vital to real-world 
outcomes.237 
Because the concept of materiality is so laden with definitions and 
limitations that do not serve the purposes of accurate factfinding, it may be 
advisable to abandon the term altogether.238  Materiality must be given its 
originally understood definition—having the “tendency to influence, or [] 
 
 233 Whitney v. State, No. 05-17-00417-CR, 2018 WL 3583358, at *3 (Tex. App. July 26, 
2018); Moody v. State, 551 S.W.3d 167, 171 (Tex. App. 2017) (“[P]assage of the Michael 
Morton Act in 2014 amended article 39.14(a) . . . Appellant does not provide argument or 
authority to explain why article 39.14(a) would impose any greater duty of preservation on 
the State than has previously been imposed under Youngblood and other jurisprudence, that 
is, that the State may destroy potentially favorable evidence as long as it does not do so in bad 
faith, i.e., at a time when its potential for exoneration was apparent.”) (emphasis added); Meza 
v. State, No. 07-15-00418-CR, 2016 WL 5786949 at *2 (Tex. App. Sep. 29, 2016) (citation 
omitted). 
 234 Hart v. State, 2016 WL 4533419, at *5 (Tex. App. Aug. 30, 2016) (“The Act creates a 
general, continuous duty of the State to disclose before, during, or after trial any discovery 
evidence tending to negate the guilt of the defendant or reduce the punishment the defendant 
could receive.”). 
 235 See generally Hillman v. Nueces Cty., No. 17-0588, 2019 WL 1231341, at *1 (Tex. 
Mar. 15, 2019). 
 236 Without judicial enforcement, the Act loses its meaning. If applied with a correct 
interpretation of materiality, the Act can make a big difference; of the change, Travis County 
District Attorney Rosemary Lehmberg said, “We’ve got to have every scrap of evidence. It’s 
the way things should be, but we have been surprised at how dramatic the increase in the 
workload has been.” Esther Robards-Forbes, Michael Morton Act boosts transparency — and 
workload, attorneys say, STATESMAN (Aug. 11, 2014), https://www.statesman.com/news/
20140811/michael-morton-act-boosts-transparency--and-workload-attorneys-say [https://per
ma.cc/5A2W-Z2R6]. 
 237 See infra Section II, III. 
 238 See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 298 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting). Since we 
have given materiality such a broken and twisted definition, it seems wise to define it anew—
or scrap it. 
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capable of influencing, the decision of the tribunal in making a determination 
required to be made.”239  The interpretations of the Morton Act demonstrate 
the long-standing commitment many lawyers—prosecutors and judges 
alike—have to inaccurate definitions of materiality.240  For the Morton Act 
to realize its full potential, it will be necessary for the Criminal Court of 
Appeals to rule on the materiality issue in line with the purposes of the 
legislature.241  The Morton Act endeavored to move towards a more 
explanatory account of the evidence but has been held back by materiality 
definitions underpinned by probabilism. 
CONCLUSION 
While there has been a movement towards an explanatory conception 
of juridical proof, that movement is only beginning to take root.  If factfinders 
are expected to hand down confident verdicts, then the trial processes and 
evidentiary standards we employ must reflect how humans reason and make 
decisions.  Explanatory concepts provide the best current model for how 
trials function, and in turn, show how Brady, criminal discovery, and 
pervading ideas about the materiality of evidence are pivotal to the success 
of our legal system.  Remember that trials are processes in which factfinders 
weigh the competing explanations of what happened against the evidence 
presented at trial and the burden of proof; depriving a party of information 
she could use in presenting her case, then, is an affront to due process of law.  
If we are to maintain our commitment to due process of law and hold the 
State to its burden, criminal discovery must be expanded to give each party 
full opportunity to develop her own account of the evidence. 
Both the Supreme Court and lower courts need to abandon probabilistic 
language in their materiality inquiry.  Although the Supreme Court has 
moved towards an explanatory account of evidence and has pushed lower 
courts to examine how suppressed evidence relates to the case as a whole and 
the parties’ strategies, the Court has relapsed into probabilism at critical 
 
 239 Weinstock v. United States, 231 F.2d 699, 702–03 (D.C. 1956); see also COMMITTEE 
REPORT, supra note 206, at 1 (describing how the Morton Act gives a defendant access to “the 
evidence relevant to his guilt or innocence”). 
 240 State v. Escobedo, No. 13-16-00684-CR, 2018 WL 6627321, at *7 (Tex. App. Dec. 
19, 2018) (equating the Morton Act with a Brady assessment and holding that “there is not a 
reasonable probability that but for the failure to produce the undisclosed information . . . the 
jury would not have convicted [the defendant].”); Nelson v. State, 2018 WL 6495171 at *13 
(Tex. App. Dec. 11, 2018) (“Limited statutory discovery is available pursuant to . . . article 
39.14 . . . Article 39.14 does not require the State to comply with general tools of discovery 
used in civil cases, such as the requests for admissions and requests for production of 
documents that appellants served here.”). 
 241 Or for the legislature to amend its work. 
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junctures.  Those lapses into probabilism diminish the burden placed on the 
State, because the defendant cannot fully present her case.  This constitutes 
a violation of due process of law.  The materiality of evidence is not a 
question of whether the outcome of the trial would have changed, but instead 
whether the evidence could be used to influence the factfinder in reaching a 
verdict.  Withholding this evidence from the defendant diminishes the State’s 
burden, increases the burden for the defense, and casts doubt over whether a 
conviction has been found beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Texas story shows that so long as probabilism remains part of the 
materiality test, judges and prosecutors have the means to skirt modern and 
more accurate materiality standards.  Moreover, the Texas experience also 
shows that changing how we define materiality is imperative even where 
legislative reform is successful.  In the meantime, the states seeking to reform 
their criminal discovery would be best served by either removing materiality 
language from discovery statutes or defining materiality very specifically—
particularly in recognition of the widespread judicial adherence to an 
incorrect conception of materiality.  The Morton Act shows a commitment 
to creating fair trials, but its shortfalls show what the next crux of reform 
must be. 
For the United States to retain its commitment to rule of law and due 
process, it must materially rethink criminal discovery. 
